



Daily Report

Supplement

Sub-Saharan Africa

FBIS-AFR-90-046-S
Thursday
8 March 1990

Sub-Saharan Africa SUPPLEMENT

FBIS-AFR-90-046-S

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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* Impact of Cold War End on Continent Analyzed

34000390 London AFRICA NEWSFILE in English
15 Jan 90 p 2—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Text] If, as seems likely, Malta signalled the end of the Cold War, just where does that leave Africa? The answer must be seen in a number of changes, some of momentous significance for the continent, in the course of the next few years. Possibly, and not without irony, an end to the Cold War will lead to a realization of greater African self-reliance for the first time since the independence era.

In the first place, the USSR wants to disengage from confrontation politics with the West and this will mean that governments such as that in Luanda which have come to rely upon Moscow's aid, will be able to do so no longer. Where it is already involved in Africa, which at present means the trouble spots in the south or the Horn, the USSR will now aim to work with the West - principally the U.S. - in order to bring about peaceful solutions. The spread of glasnost and superpower cooperation will produce pressures that hardliners - whether right or left wing - will find increasingly hard to ignore. The immediate result could be an end to the wars in Angola and Mozambique, certainly if the protagonists are pressured jointly by both superpowers. Then, if some really tough Soviet pressure is applied, there is at least a chance that Mengistu could be forced to the conference table with the Eritreans and Tigreans so that the Horn conflict might also be brought to an end.

Such immediate peace prospects could well emerge from the ending of the Cold War and general glasnost. More interesting will be the developments that follow thereafter.

The most intriguing question of all is just what is now going to happen to the Third World which came into existence in response to the Cold War in the first place? Back in the 1950s Pandit Nehru was the architect of the principle of non-alignment and insisted that a whole group of countries - mainly those that had just emerged from colonialism to independence - would refuse to be drawn into the quarrels of East and West in their Cold War confrontation. These new nations of the Third World were on neither side and wished to get on with their own development in their own way. The Bandung Conference of 1955 which really launched the concept of the Third World was denounced by both the U.S. through John Foster Dulles and the USSR by Khrushchev. The immediate attitude of the two superpowers was 'either you are with us or you are against us.' But Nehru was not having that.

It was not until 1961 and the first official Non-Aligned Summit at Belgrade that the superpowers - reluctantly - came to terms with the existence of the non-aligned or Third World. Then President Kennedy sent a message to the summit in which he said: "The U.S. Government is aware that the non-aligned powers assembled at Belgrade represent an important segment of world opinion....."

Gradually in the following years - Cairo 1964, Lusaka 1970, Algiers 1973, Colombo 1976, Havana 1979, New Delhi 1983, Harare 1986 and last year back in Belgrade - the non-aligned movement became increasingly the voice of the poor South petitioning the rich North (whether its First World of the capitalist West or its Second World of the communist East) to give it a better deal and - despite all the other issues that are always raised - this petitioning meant, more than anything else, better economic conditions or an increased flow of aid.

It is in this respect that glasnost could turn things upside down for Africa. Throughout the years of the Cold War it has always been possible to play off one side against the other and though in material terms the communist powers could never match the West with their aid this largely did not matter for the mere possibility of an increase in Soviet assistance was likely to spark off increased U.S. or other Western aid, since assistance offered by the one acted as an ideological spur to the other. It may now be forgotten but the extraordinary scare stories that circulated in the West at the time the Chinese built the Tazara are an indication of just how the two sides reacted in the Cold War aid game. Ludicrous as it may seem in retrospect much Western reaction to the Tanzam railway was in terms of a 'yellow peril' take over in eastern Africa; and that, moreover, was how some highly respected Western commentators on Africa reacted. The result of such attitudes was the constant readiness to ask: what can 'we' now do to match the other side?

The result of these deep held Cold War suspicions was often highly beneficial to certain African regimes which became adept at playing upon Cold War fears. The process really began in Nasser's Egypt during the saga of the Aswan High Dam and who was to build it. Zaire's Mobutu Sese Seko has become a past master at obtaining what he wants from the West by playing the communist bogey - 'what would happen if he turned in the other direction?' And no regime has played the communist angle more assiduously than Pretoria in its efforts to keep Western support for the apartheid government. What is going to happen now that such an approach no longer makes sense?

The most likely answer - after some immediate problems have been settled - will be a partial withdrawal of big power interest and a diminution of aid flows despite the recent World Bank demands for an increased flow. Since the Cold War protagonists no longer see the need to match one another's efforts they are also likely to ask whether they need make much effort at all. And though Western aid will certainly continue it is likely to do so on an even more hard-headed basis than at present and only if to give aid it serves Western economic interests.

Eastern Europe and the USSR will have enough internal problems to solve, as they sort out their economies under the new dispensations which glasnost will have created, to be much concerned with aid at all. And, perhaps for the first time since the issue of the famous appraisal of

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Africa's economic malaise in the 1979 document, 'Africa 2000', the continent will really have to think in terms of self-reliance as the chances of any incompetent regime being propped up by aid from any source steadily diminish.

* Perestroika To Affect Journalism Teaching

34000428A London WEST AFRICA in English
5-11 Feb 90 pp 176-177—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Article by Charles Quist Adade in Leningrad]

[Text] This autumn, 30 young men and women from the developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America were admitted to the Leningrad State University's faculty of journalism to start a five-year MA (Arts) degree programme in international journalism.

They form part of more than 1,000 such students enrolled each year by eight Soviet universities in Alma-Ata, Irkutsk, Minsk, Moscow, Rostov, Tashkent and Voronezh. Moscow's Lomonosov State University has more than 100 African students training to become journalists.

Since 1952, Leningrad has trained over 300 media personnel for various developing countries on a Soviet government scholarship scheme.

The perestroika which Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev is seeking to bring about in the USSR has had a knock-on effect on the training programmes of foreign students. Subjects now classified as 'irrelevant' and 'superfluous' (Russian folklore, ancient literature and the like) have been axed, and replaced by economic geography, Third World journalism, social ecology, modern economic relations and sociology.

Also new to the curriculum is a history of liberation movements. The universities are pledged to give more time to the teaching of aesthetics and ethics, international law, international relations and international propaganda.

Soviet journalism tuition aims at preparing a broadly-educated person of letters in the best tradition of writer-publicist-journalist. The philosophy is Marxism-Leninism and heavily oriented towards ideology and politics. The journalism course lasts five years, preceded by a year's preparatory course in Russian language. Thereafter, subjects include newspaper and magazine journalism, editing and publishing, plus radio and television.

All students must study the following subjects: Marxist-Leninist philosophy, history of the Communist Party, Russian and other literature, economics, atheism, Soviet law, art and typing. Much time is spent in the classroom on theoretical work, although recent changes to the curriculum could well provide for more independent study.

Unlike the Anglo-American system, which offers plenty of reporting and editing, Soviet journalism instruction places more emphasis on the techniques of collecting and transmitting information. Students are trained in a literary, rather than staccato, news style; in opinionising and interpretation, rather than the 'objective' and dispassionate transmission of facts.

The curriculum structure for university-level journalism in the USSR shows an impressive array of subjects, designed to give the student the complete all-round education required by a media professional.

But this is probably only true for Soviet trainees. Third World students (and particularly those from Africa) find the programme rather disorienting because of its poor developing countries' content, Russian-bias and Eurocentrism.

Soviet course planners, apparently preoccupied with the desire to spread the Russian language and literary traditions, fail to take cognisance of the dilemma of studying in Russian for six years only to return home to write in French, English, Portuguese, Arabic or Spanish in different cultural settings.

Thus at Leningrad, African students wallow through a ponderous five-year programme in Soviet journalism while only 32 lessons (72 hours of tuition) are assigned to a superficial reading of the history of African journalism. In three years of studying foreign literature, not a single African writer is covered. In philosophy, the course proceeds as though Africa has all these years been slumbering in a philosophical vacuum.

And to add insult to injury, students are taught to type only on Russian letter typewriters as though they are to write for Tass or PF AVDA on completion.

The importance of language mastery for the journalist cannot be overemphasised. For those students straight from secondary school, without a prior knowledge of the Russian language, the problem is even more acute. Yet they are made to make the first steps in their future profession in the difficult Russian language. Even the preliminary year's language training does not lead to a mastery of Russian text-books into which the student has to delve.

Consequently, a great deal that takes place in the lecture theatres during the first three years cannot be effectively absorbed. Text books on Soviet journalism remain largely untranslated and journalism text-books by foreign authors remain practically non-existent in libraries.

The linchpin of journalistic training, like that of any profession, is the imparting of skills. And this is done by subjecting students to systematic drills.

During a recent meeting with the Leningrad branch of the USSR Union of Journalists, foreign students complained bitterly about this lack of organised practical training. The best the union branch has been able to do

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so far is to arrange monthly seminars on international affairs, hardly an effective substitute to show one's skills in a practical way.

Although the USSR has a good number of foreign language news magazines and Radio Moscow's international service, which could offer good opportunities for experience attachments, students are left to make their own arrangements for familiarisation attachments. Only a handful manage to return home because of punitively high transport costs, and as attachments to Soviet publications are difficult to obtain, a high percentage of Third World students finish their training without having had any meaningful practical experience. It is hard to disguise one's feelings that Soviet training of foreign journalists is proving a disservice disguised as assistance; a waste pretending to be an asset. On the present curriculum it is difficult to see how Third World media students training in the USSR can be expected to return to work effectively in their own countries.

It has been suggested that instead of bringing 1,000 students annually to study journalism, the Russian authorities should consider training only a caucus of future trainers and let them staff journalism schools in their own countries.

Part of Soviet assistance could be directed towards equipping and expanding existing schools of journalism in the developing world. Third World countries would unquestionably find such a system more beneficial.

Fortunately, Third World students may not have to wait for long before a change for the better comes. Thanks to perestroika and glasnost (openness) Soviet leaders have of late been critical of the low standards in journalism in their country.

They blame shortcomings in the training programmes even for their own journalism. It is expected that a new mass media policy, to be fashioned by the new Soviet parliament, will bring the change.

* Iraq's Husayn's Ambitions in Africa Disclosed

90EF0198A Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French
22 Jan 90 pp 40-42—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Article by Francois Soudan: "Saddam Husayn's African Offensive"; first paragraph is JEUNE AFRIQUE introduction.]

[Text] Baghdad is lavishing weapons and installing advisers from Nouakchott to Ndjamena, from Khartoum to Djibouti—the entire length of the "crisis crescent" of the Sahel. Like Israel further south, Iraq is taking advantage of the diminished presence of the superpowers and the relative disengagement of the former colonial powers to move in and set up shop. Acting in the name of Arabism, it presents a weighty argument: its expertise in defense and security. Saddam Husayn's diplomatic efforts in Africa target countries in a state of crisis. The days when Iraqi petrodollars

financed mosques and refineries (not to mention "sister parties") has given way to an era of aid in heavy military equipment.

On 28 October 1989, on the Fao Peninsula, among the hundreds of guests in attendance at the noisy ceremonies marking the reconstruction of the "martyr port" of the Qaddisiya (Baghdad's name for the war with Iran) with liberal doses of martial music, triumphal arches, and giant portraits of Saddam Husayn, were eight African delegations. Perhaps it would be useful to name them, since they reveal the rather clear outlines of a new Iraqi policy of interventionism in Africa, much more closely tied this time to the export of Kalashnikovs than to that of oil. These countries—Mauritania, Mali, Senegal, Chad, Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, and Zambia—form a kind of "crisis crescent" of the Sahel (with a curious southern extrusion) along the often strife-torn border between the two Africas, squarely in the middle of the zone of Islamic expansion. Since the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq 18 months ago, this has been the arena of Saddam Husayn's new African ambitions.

"Drive for power" would be a more accurate term than "ambitions." Iraq feels that its war in defense of the Arab world has won it the right to play in the superpowers' African backyard. In Baghdad, of course, they explain that this breakthrough should be seen as a simple return. In the late 1970's, before the outbreak of the Gulf war, Iraq had, in fact, already developed a very definite case of the African itch. However, with the passing of the war, the means, objectives, and nature of this interventionism have changed considerably. Before, the primary goal was to counter Egypt and Saudi Arabia's "reactionary" influence in the field of aid. Mosques, joint ventures, refineries, and crude oil shipments: all these projects belonged to an era when Baghdad hardly counted its petrodollars. Since then, an enormous debt, altered alliances, and a determined search for a sphere of influence have sharpened the thrust of Iraqi expansion, which has been primarily military in nature.

Iraq's drive is served by its ideology, its men, and its military equipment. Ba'athism usually provides the guarantee and the facade. While the days are over when Saddam Husayn used to set up and finance groups inspired by the philosophy of Michel Aflak here and there throughout the Africa of the Sahel, the following reasoning is often voiced at Baghdad colloquia before large audiences of invited African intellectuals: Iraq, confronted by Iran, is defending the eastern flank of the Arab world; Mauritania, the western flank; and Sudan, the southern flank. However, Iraq speaks in more than military metaphors. When addressing states in which the ideology of the "Arab nation" has no hold (or might even act as a foil), the military imagery gives way to more refined arguments. Baghdad then puts forward the need for countries with an Islamic majority to combat the Israeli influence, their need to achieve true independence from the old colonial powers, and, above all, its own expertise in security matters.

A look at the large illustrated placards in front of most Iraqi embassies in Africa is all you need to see how Baghdad is getting propaganda mileage out of its weapons industry, military victories, and impressive weapons inventory. Snapshots of the Iranian front appear side by side with photographs of the Tammuz, Al Husayn, and Al Abbas "national" missiles, views of restored Babylon, and portraits of Saddam. Despite its rather unsophisticated nature, the Al Obeid missile, launched in late November 1989, also gave rise to an intense propaganda campaign on the theme: "See what we can do." Whether impressed or anxious to appear so, certain heads of state, including Mauritania's Maaouiya Ould Taya, immediately sent Saddam Husayn congratulatory messages. Lastly, it appears that Iraq has decided to train specialists on Africa who are not foot soldiers of Ba'athism, as in the past, even if most of the current ambassadors are to a greater or lesser extent security and special services men. However, in the land of Saddam Husayn, this is a veritable national anomaly. In Baghdad itself, "African affairs" are much more the province of the special services than of Tariq 'Aziz's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Hassan Fadoul Kitir, who represented Chad in Baghdad until mid-1988, told us: "As soon as I arrived, after a brief visit to the ministry, I was taken in tow by security. Security is responsible for us, and my only relations were with my assigned officer."

The first center of Iraqi activity in Africa involves the area of the Sahel, where the crisis situation facilitates rapid, massive intervention. Chad is the least recent example. The natural incompatibility between al-Qadhafi and Saddam Husayn (both aspire to the same role in the Arab community) and Libya's long support for Iran during the Gulf war led Baghdad to support the Njamena government as soon as Hissein Habre came to power. Iraq supplied the FANT [Chadian National Armed Forces] with a great number of free arms, in conjunction with aid from Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Egyptian and Iraqi efforts are fairly complementary, and the recent exodus of Egyptian emigrants from Iraq does not seem to have impeded their relative coordination in Africa. Since then, Iraq's psychological ascendancy in Chad, which remains strong, has returned to somewhat more normal levels for various reasons: the abatement of the war between Chad and Libya, the improvement of relations between Tripoli and Baghdad, and, above all, Hissein Habre's balancing act. Habre has always been able to reconcile the Iraqi connection with the presence of French troops and support from Zaire.

Today, Chad's neighbor, Sudan, is probably Baghdad's principal "target" in Africa. The extremely precarious nature of the domestic situation and the enfeebled state of the government do present a great temptation. The occupation of the "Arab" village of Kurmuk by Colonel Garang's southern rebels in late October 1989 brought a sudden increase in the number of weapons delivered to the military airport in Khartoum (they continue to arrive at the rate of one large carrier a week), and Iraq has probably replaced Libya as Sudan's biggest arms supplier. "For us, it is a matter of showing this country our

thanks for the thousands of Sudanese volunteers who fought side by side with us during the Qaddisiya," they say in Baghdad. Be that as it may, obviously, for Iraq, Sudan is an Arab country whose gradual partition and whose leanings toward Islamic fundamentalism (incarnated by former prime minister Sadek el Madhi, who maintained far from negligible relations with Tehran) must be stopped. In addition, the fact that it borders on two states on cordial terms with Israel—Ethiopia and the Central African Republic—is seen as "dangerous" in Baghdad. Some of the weapons recently supplied to Sudan by Iraq ended up in the arsenal of the Eritrean forces.

You cannot have one thing without the other: military hardware always comes with technical experts and other advisers responsible for instructing in its operation. Several dozen were sent to Chad (including security advisers). There are around 100 in Sudan, and, until recently, there were some 40 in Mauritania. Lodged at the embassy and a hotel in Nouakchott, they were responsible for installing weapons supplied by Iraq and instructing certain units at the height of the Senegalese-Mauritanian crisis (May-July 1989). The Mauritanian army, which was sorely in need of the assault rifles, SAM-7 anti-aircraft missiles, mortars, and munitions that it received, is now equipped. For greater discretion, the bulk of this equipment was flown into the capital's closed airport at night. Several dozen noncommissioned and commissioned officers were also sent for training in Iraq from July to December 1989. "We need aid in the event of a military conflict," they say in Nouakchott, "but France has a base and aircraft in Senegal, Morocco supports Dakar, Algeria does not want to get involved, and al-Qadhafi might have dug in. Iraq has an advantage: it is a very long way from our borders." The nationalistic Mauritians say that they will never have their hands tied and that the advisers will never descend on the river, and they are probably right. Confident and serene, Iraqi diplomats appear to be betting on the long haul. They now emphasize ties to the powers that be rather than with pressure groups devoted to Iraq. For example, they do not appear greatly moved by the repressive measures that have imprisoned most of the Ba'athist activists in Mauritania and Sudan.

The second center of Iraqi activity south of the Sahara involves the highly Islamic countries, specifically the members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). In the international arena, where the rule is "one State, one vote," their clientele is not to be ignored. Iraq has asked Senegal to contribute heavily to the material security of the next OIC summit, scheduled for 1991 in Dakar. Its support for Mauritanian rearmament apparently does not prevent it from giving Kalashnikovs to the Senegalese. Saddam Husayn's "Africans" are well-established in Mali, and they also coexist with the French in Djibouti. President Hassan Gouled Aptidon, to whom Iraq gave a Mystere 50 for his official travel, appears convinced of the need for a variety of sources of aid and protection—a line of reasoning shared by some

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of his peers, who have themselves chosen Israel. The Iraqis are cautiously close to Somalia's Siad Barre (they probably prefer to leave the risks of unconditional support to the Libyans) and have just recently established a foothold in the Comoros, an OIC member country, to the point of contributing to the campaign financing of Ahmed Abdallah. Abdallah, who has since been assassinated, probably did not think in time to ask for an umbrella that would have proved useful.

Irritated and somewhat concerned by the appearance of this intruder, who does not speak their language and, they say, does not use their methods, certain Western chancelleries are wondering just how far Iraq will go in Africa. Some do not hesitate to point to the zones of

conflict here and there where Iraqi dynamism and Israeli interests will inevitably clash. Others, probably the more reasonable, emphasize that Baghdad's means of action will necessarily be limited and will, therefore, be concentrated on a handful of crisis countries. "On what grounds can we be forbidden to take an interest in Africa? Is it a private club?" an Iraqi diplomat encountered in the main lounge of an African airport recently complained. Outside, a little Iraqi Airways green and white jet was waiting on the runway. It happened to be the plane of Yasir 'Arafat, who was visiting one African capital that day before taking off for the next—and who, whether he likes it or not, has thus become one of the mainstays of Saddam Husayn's African ambitions.

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* Nature of African Political Corruption Examined

90EF0246A Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Jan 90 pp 4-5
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[Article by Jean-Francois Bayart, researcher at the French National Political Science Foundation's Center for International Studies and Research: "Money, Power, and Society in Black Africa: "Corruption" or "Belly Politics"? Mr. Bayart is the author of a recent book, "The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly," published by Editions Fayard (reviewed in MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 12 May 1989, pp 1270-1271). First sentence is MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS subhead.]

[Text] At a time when analyses are increasingly linking economic failures in Sub-Saharan Africa to corruption, Jean-Francois Bayart, the French political scientist whose works, "The State in Cameroon" and "The State in Africa," have achieved international renown, shares with us a few personal observations concerning this delicate issue.

Ask Joe Frenchman to sum up his idea of politics in Africa, and he will inevitably mention "tribal conflict" and condescendingly criticize "corrupt Negro kings."

There are now a number of works available that should help the reader anxious to improve his mind to place the first of these stereotypes in perspective.¹ But what about corruption? Does it not play a major role in the life of Africa's post-colonial states? Is it not overwhelmingly responsible for the African economic crisis?

In a way, scholarly research confirms these assertions. It shows that the ruler or, in politically decentralized societies, the hereditary leaders, have exercised a monopoly on the circulation of wealth. It emphasizes that, in a certain sense, colonialism perpetuated this model of accumulation to the benefit of its native collaborators. It suggests that the post-colonial state has only systematized these practices.

Thus, the "overlap" between positions of power and positions of accumulation, to borrow an expression from Kenyan historians, is central to the genetic equation of contemporary African societies—to such an extent that, in a reversal of the assumption of the classical Marxist vulgate, it has been argued that social inequality was created by politics. This argument probably goes too far, because those in power, however greedy, never manage to control all the paths to riches, as has recently been demonstrated in a noteworthy book on Zaire.²

The assertion is even almost wrong, in that it often leads to contrasting a "bureaucratic middle class," readily characterized as corrupt and incapable, with an authentic "commercial middle class," on whom all hopes of recovery are pinned. However, with all due respect to the wide-eyed advocates of "privatizing" the African economies, the continent's problems are not due to the excessive weight of state-owned companies. It has

been donkey's years since the state-owned companies—and the state itself—were "privatized." An analysis of colonial institutions and nationalist movements shows that the individual strategies of political entrepreneurs, whose concern was for their own material interests as much as for those of their clients, already prevailed on both accounts.

Might not the stagnation of Africa and its poor image in Western opinion be attributable to this very "privatization" of the state? Allow us to express our doubts on this subject for once and for all. "Corruption"—if the concept is in the least coherent when applied to such diverse cultural and historical contexts—is in no way peculiar to Africa, as current events in the Soviet Union, China, Japan, Turkey, and Panama remind us. We all know what goes on in French municipal government, American unions, and international trade. And the phenomenon of the "overlap" between positions of power and positions of accumulation would not surprise Daniel Dessert's³ readers. Richelieu, Mazerin, Fouquet, and Colbert were not repelled by the notion of mixing money and politics.

The singularity of Black Africa lies elsewhere: in the correlation between what is in itself a banal practice, "corruption" (or, to put it better, the "overlap"), and the perpetuation of a profit-oriented—even predatory—economy. (In contrast, in southeast Asia, for example, bribes are generally associated with the growth of a productive, if not production-oriented, economy.) This singular correlation is rooted in *homo africanus*' moral representation of the state and, specifically, in the symbols and beliefs that it involves.

In other words, the real problem in Africa is not some sort of a historically defined "corruption." It is the practice of what the Cameroonians call "belly politics" as a form of "government" in the old sense of the word—what Michel Foucault would have called "governmentality." The "belly" theme appears widespread south of the Sahara. The Nigerians speak of "slices of the national pie." The Ugandans call the "nouveaux riches" who profited from Amin Dada's expropriation of the Indian and Pakistani merchants the *mafuta mingi*—the "drenched with oil." In Swahili, the word for faction is *kula* (eating).

Of course, this language of the belly is not specific to Africa. In the seventeenth century, the Tuscans said of their *provveditore* that he "ate" of everything that came within his grasp.⁴ The Spanish have a proverb comparable to the Cameroonians' famous "The goat grazes where it is tied." In "The Oak and the Calf," Solzhenitsyn writes that the members of the nomenclatura "nibble." According to LE CANARD ENCHAINE, even Jacques Chirac complains that the RPR [Rally for the Republic] "reformers" should be "grateful that their bellies are full."

Nevertheless, in Africa, the theme of "eating" is linked to two unique cultural givens, which are also closely

interrrelated. The first is munificence, which, for example, makes physical corpulence a political quality. The second and more important is the invisible, i.e., the night world of the ancestors, dream, divination, magic, and witchcraft, the seat of which just happens to be the belly. When Africans say that their political leaders are "eating" them to indicate that they are exploiting them economically by demanding too much money, they attach a disturbing connotation to this expression that has haunted them since their childhood and will obsess them until their death: that of the specter of witchcraft, wielded as a weapon, bringing the aggressor prosperity and the victim failure, sickness, and misfortune.

This vision of the world is not a residual tradition that "development" will sooner or later eradicate. It is at the heart of modern Africa. Personal, family, societal, and political relations are still implicitly experienced in terms of the invisible. Just as the slave trade once was interpreted as a particular form of witchcraft—*ekong* witchcraft in Cameroon, for example—the postcolonial paracapitalist state, with its inexplicable individual ascensions, its factional struggles, its electoral battles, its ministerial reshufflings, and its continual denunciations continues to be associated with this nocturnal dimension. In many respects, the man who holds a position of power is like the child-eating ogress found by Denise Paulme in a number of fables.⁵

His only hope of escaping this suspicion is to redistribute the gains and to demonstrate his generosity to those around him: his customers or, for a man with national ambitions, the entire nation. The art of politics consists of finding a balance—a precarious one, by definition—between the accumulation of individual wealth and the commandment to share, the breaking of which may betray the diabolical hand of the invisible.

This subtle game inherently favors the private appropriation of public wealth. In economies in which the forces of production are poorly developed, the politician and the public employee are inclined to take money from the state or the citizen to meet not only their personal needs but also those of the people who come asking for money in one "courtesy call" after another. The bureaucratic institution itself becomes a resource, a piece of the "national pie" whose slicing is at the root of conflicts that have too systematically been termed ethnic.

Worse still, "belly politics" itself tends to impede the development of the forces of production, which, in the long run, are the only thing that may be capable of diminishing the role of the "overlap" in the accumulation of wealth. It is founded on the ethos of munificence, which culminates in ostentatious apparel, dining, and architecture, thereby engendering a whole series of extravagant expenses. "Belly politics" also makes the accusation of witchcraft—along with geographic mobility and guile—a means for social groups to oppose the autonomization of power, the accumulation of wealth, and the creation of an economic surplus big enough to finance a materially powerful civilization. In

this respect, without really speaking of a cause-and-effect relationship, it is possible to see a connection between the psychological hold of the invisible and the lack of social polarization that characterized ancient Africa (with the sole exception of Ethiopia) in comparison with Asia or Europe.

Indeed, for Africans, one of the major outcomes of the twentieth century will be either the accentuation or the containment of inequality. Never have the governors had at their disposal so many economic, technological, and military tools for ensuring their own absolute dominance over the governed. Yet the governed are in turn reappropriating the concept of the state imported by the colonialists and are setting the colonial model of the *res publica* side by side with their own practice of "belly politics." It is a grave mistake to believe that Africans consider "corruption" normal because it is "traditional." No political line is more popular south of the Sahara today than that of denouncing corruption. Leaders like Thomas Sankara in Burkina Faso or Jerry Rawlings in Ghana have drawn their extraordinary charisma from it. Other heads of state understand the formula. Despite their personal enrichment, they use this genre of "moralization" to defeat their potential rivals (with the support of public opinion), as well as to regulate political competition to their profit. Lastly, opposition parties, such as the Democratic Union for Social Progress in Zaire, are courageously militating for the establishment of a state of law in which rights and the general interest are respected.

However, although the redemptive sensibility that is sweeping the continent and stigmatizing corruption bears the stamp of Christian or Muslim religiosity, it is, at the same time, still nourished by the collective lore of the invisible—hence its ambivalence. On the one hand, the attachment of greater value to the state and the censure of those that appropriate it are more or less conscious extensions of the many antiwitchcraft movements that have punctuated the history of Africa for several centuries. On the other, by making redistribution a moral duty and munificence a political quality, the same beliefs encourage the embezzlement of public funds and the direct exploitation of the people who use the bureaucracy.

The future of Africa depends to a notable extent on its ability to go beyond this contradiction. Meanwhile, as one of Kenyan novelist Ngugi wa Thiong'o's characters tells us, "You eat somebody or you are eaten." It is a terrible dilemma—and one that makes sense within the context of a specific cosmology and a specific history, and not in the light of condescending moralism or technocratic economics.

Footnotes

1. Jean-Loup Amselle, Elikia Mbokolo, dir., *"Au coeur de l'ethnie. Ethnies, tribalisme et Etat en Afrique"* [At the heart of the ethnic group. Ethnic groups, tribalism, and the state in Africa], Paris, La Découverte, 1985, and

Jean-Pierre Cretien, Gerard Prunier, dir., "*Les ethnies ont une histoire*" [Ethnic groups have a history], Paris, Karthala, 1989.

2. Janet MacGaffey, "Entrepreneurs and Parasites. The Struggle for Indigenous Capitalism in Zaïre," Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987. 3. Daniel Dessert, "*Argent, pouvoir et société au Grand siècle*" [Money, power and society in seventeenth century France], Paris, Fayard, 1984.

4. Jean-Claude Waquet, "*De la corruption. Morale et pouvoir à Florence aux XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles*" [On corruption. Morality and power in seventeenth and eighteenth century Florence], Paris, Fayard, 1984, p. 26.

5. Denise Paulme, "*La mère dévorante. Essai sur la morphologie des contes africains*" [The devouring mother. Essay on the morphology of African fables], Paris, Gallimard, 1976.

* Ways To Improve African Enterprises Discussed

90EF0206A Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Jan 90 p 84
—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Article by Dominique Brunin: "African Enterprises: Top Priority to Development; the 3 January Colloquium at the National Center for Scientific Research"]

[Text] Once again Nigeria held center stage at the colloquium organized by the "Anglophone Africa" Club of the International Relations Committee of the National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS). The theme for this meeting, "How to make the African enterprise more efficient through organization and staff training," was of interest to just a select but attentive audience.

Staff recruitment and training are the keys for the enterprise of tomorrow.

In fact, the human resource management problem pretty much goes beyond physical borders and linguistic, ethnic, religious, and historical differences. In Africa enterprise is faced with this choice: to deny these issues or, on the other hand, to incorporate them into day-to-day management but also, in the medium and long term, the problem of manpower.

In this regard Jacques Laureau, the French ambassador to Nigeria, reminded his audience that even before a business set itself up in a country, it needed to be aware of the facts. And the facts about Nigeria, the country that would serve as the point of reference for several of the speakers, were generally not known.

The Human Factor, the Determining Factor

A GNP (gross national product) of approximately \$23 billion, greater than the GNP's taken together of the French-speaking countries of Africa, oil production 2.5 times greater than Angola's, a currency that influences

exchanges in the heart of West Africa, these are various facts about Nigeria. But this is insignificant when compared to the initial and unavoidable piece of information: a population estimated at 110 million people! It is also a fact that the traditional elite, which was not destroyed during the colonial period and that today has learned how to preserve itself and to reproduce, has as its mission the avoidance of any sociological break; in Nigerian culture, in the past as well as today, a desire for wealth and the desire to preserve enterprise and to provide safeguards are constants.

Given these stable facts, industrialists can dig in and expand their activity in various fields of investment: the petroleum sector, the agricultural and food sector, or the mechanical sector.

'The Logic of Friends,' a Recruitment Approach

Mr. A. Henry, who is in charge of training for African businessmen for the Center for Financial, Economic, and Banking Studies, introduced the basic concept in recruitment: because confidence is not the simplest thing in Africa, when it comes to hiring, then, you had better use the technique of sponsorship.

In this way you avoid the problem of the enterprise's being anonymous, of the young manager's being anonymous to a group he does not know and to whose values he will not automatically adhere.

The technique of sponsorship makes possible the introduction of the notion of indebtedness with regard to someone, since you cannot shame the person you have chosen as your model. Because it is long-lasting, information must help integrate this new recruit totally.

This was the point made from his own experience, by Mr. Teju Oyeleye, the president of the Nigerian Institute of Management.¹

For Mr. Oyeleye, hiring someone, whether it be through some sort of open recruitment, by advertisement, or closed recruitment, because you know someone or through a recommendation, takes time. Taking time allows the employer to detect all of an individual's cultural assets: honesty, "a rejection of evil," allegiance, and respect for a code of conduct, and to separate these from factors that could threaten homogeneity and harmony: tribalism or an intense religious feeling.

Training then responds very specifically to the need to teach, on the one hand, to teach employees how to maintain materiel to avoid breakdowns or destruction, which are synonymous with financial losses, and on the other hand, to show union leaders what the various implications of a company's thrust is.

It is thus evident, if it was not already so, that our management models cannot be applied as is, given the need to take special environmental factors into consideration. In this regard the talk by Mr. Alain Bernard, a professor at the Advanced School for Economic and

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Commercial Sciences (ESSEC) who has been involved for more than 10 years in management training for Nigerian businessmen, was particularly interesting inasmuch as it too was based on specific knowledge.

Testing the validity of management concepts in the light of cultural differences and special characteristics can only lead to enrichment on both sides. Certain concepts, and understanding and utilizing them, differ completely, and two stages are needed to prove this: you start with an assessment of the environment for enterprises and of labor conditions and you try to come up with solutions.

The Environment for Enterprises and Revitalization

In Mr. Bernard's view, Nigerian enterprise is more or less the victim of its environment, the latter factor influencing labor conditions negatively. In the major "parastatal" enterprises, even if Nigeria puts forward an ambitious development project, the political environment is still subject to major human cleavages, and this acts as a brake. As for the operational environment, it is characterized by logistical and maintenance problems, a bureaucratic ponderousness makes the economy less efficient. Finally, in the social-emotive and sociocultural areas, an enterprise is viewed as something that furnishes a job and is thus deeply involved in family life. But Nigerian enterprise runs into a lack of industrial awareness and a lack of enthusiasm for "junior posts."

In precise terms, with regard to labor conditions, the combination of these factors brings about a hyperdetermination of social-emotive traits, generating complete inertia.

To try to respond to these negative traits, some Nigerian researchers have proposed simple solutions, ones that incorporate African cultural facts:

- 1) Returning to the notion of patronage.
- 2) Reestablishing the symbolism of the trial period.
- 3) Disseminating the spirit of discipline among one's fellow workers.

All of this seems to be a most attractive program, but the very process of implementing it runs into an obstacle emphasized by Mr. Philippe Delalande: the notion of integrating special African conditions into human resource management is not an obvious one for Africans: why should you go looking for special cultural factors, which are synonymous with impediments to development, and try to integrate them?

Answering this question was not the issue. Mr. Delalande did say, however, that the enterprises that worked were those that had integrated these factors by establishing monoethnic or multiethnic firms utilizing the skills of each group.

In fact, the ability individuals have to adapt to the constant changes of our age will probably lead to their survival. But to do so, as one speaker pointed out, Africans must be able to alter their own conception of time.

Footnote

1. MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEE'S special section on "African Industry" will carry a lengthy interview with Mr. Oyeleye and later will review this colloquium, with its papers by Mr. J.P. Prouteau and industrialists.

Burundi*** Collapse of Coffee Prices Causes Diversification**

34000374A London AFRICAN BUSINESS in English
Jan pp 33-34—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Article by Francois Misser in Bujumbura: "Export Hopes Hang On Textiles and Sugar"]

[Text] The collapse of world coffee prices has strengthened the resolve of Burundi's economic planners to diversify the economy away from coffee, which normally brings in about 80 percent of the country's foreign exchange.

To this end, they are pinning their hopes on industry and the handicrafts sector as the main alternatives. At present, the handicrafts sector contributes only 3 percent of Burundi's GDP [gross domestic product] and accounts for 60,000 jobs. But projects to boost the sector, Rural Development Minister Gabriel Toyi told *AB*, envisage raising these figures to 15 percent of GDP and 500,000 jobs by the year 2000. These 500,000 jobs would then provide employment for 10 percent of the country's total population of 5m people.

Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the rural areas are to be encouraged to take up basket-weaving, carpentry and many types of manufacturing activities.

Local Roofing Tiles

Burundi's planners have also decided to co-ordinate their efforts to improve the nation's housing with their efforts towards import substitution.

Currently, 70 percent of all rural houses still have thatched roofs. The country has set itself a goal of replacing all thatched roofs by the year 2000. So far, all the replacement roofs have been made of imported metal sheeting. But a recent decision calls for all new roofs provided after 1997 to be made of locally produced roofing tiles rather than from imported materials.

But most of all, planners are looking to industry to carry the hope of export diversification. They see potential for better export performance in textiles, sugar refining and brewing. Plans also include the industrial exploitation of gold deposits in the north of the country.

In textiles, the state-owned textile complex **Cotebu**, in Bujumbura, has added capacity in the past two years. The company boosted its output by 27 percent in 1988, from 9.58m metres of cloth in 1987 to 11.5m metres in 1988. Production rose further in 1989, to an estimated 12m metres, of which 600,000 metres is of cotton polyester.

Cotebu has increased its workforce by one-fifth since the beginning of 1988, creating 280-some new jobs and bringing its total workforce to 1,700. The factory now operates during weekends and holidays.

Profits

Cotebu's turnover for 1989 is estimated at 2.2bn Burundi francs (\$13.76m), while its profit for the same year is estimated at BuF250m (\$1.56m).

According to official figures, about 12 percent of Cotebu's 1988 output was exported to Zaire. But business sources in Bujumbura estimate that if all the cloth smuggled from Burundi into Zaire is counted as well, then closer to 50 percent of Cotebu's output is exported to eastern Zaire.

Cotebu is able to charge lower prices than its main competitor inside Zaire, a factory situated at Kalemie, on Lake Tanganyika. The reason, according to a Cotebu source, is that Cotebu uses cotton grown in Burundi as its raw material, while the Kalemie factory has to rely on imported raw materials.

Zaire produces textile products in and around Kinshasa, but the poor state of the transport system in the huge country makes it much more practical for eastern Zaire to buy its cloth from Bujumbura, which is 300km north of Kalemie and is served by a much better transport infrastructure, than from Kinshasa, which is 1,500km away as the crow flies and is much, much farther away by Zaire's cumbersome surface routes.

Then too, Cotebu contends that its product is of a higher quality because it is thicker and because it boasts more vivid colours. About 30 percent of Cotebu's output is garments, while the remaining 70 percent is flat fabric.

Sugar is another subsector which is seen by the authorities as offering encouragement. The newly built sugar factory of the **Societe Sucriere du Mosso (Sosumo)** produced an estimated 8,000 tonnes of sugar in 1989 and had an estimated turnover of BuF820m (\$5.13m) in that year.

The government expects Sosumo to produce 23,000t per annum by 1993, which is 6,000t above the break-even point. To achieve this level, though, additional investment is required. Its current installed capacity is 16,000t per annum, which already exceeds Burundi's national demand for sugar of 14,000t per annum.

Sugar Exports

The Burundi authorities are quite confident that Sosumo can break into the neighbouring markets of Rwanda and eastern Zaire in the near future. The current price of Sosumo sugar is BuF103 (64 US cents) a kilogramme, which Sosumo reports is slightly more competitive than the price in Zaire (the equivalent of BuF113) and significantly more competitive than the price in Rwanda (equivalent to BuF200).

The Sosumo sugar factory has been a source of controversy among the donors who financed the \$70m project. The African Development Bank, the Opec Fund and Belgium agreed that the factory could be economically viable, but World Bank officials branded it a white

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elephant. The Bank argued that the surrounding plantations would not provide enough raw cane to enable the factory to reach the output levels that were being projected.

Of the \$70m investment, about half went into the building of the factory, and the other half went towards establishing plantations and support infrastructure such as staff housing.

Sosumo managers admit that the factory developed much faster than the plantations, but they maintain that the problem is not a permanent one. Instead, they point to the potential growth in the local market as a cause for optimism. One of Sosumo's largest domestic clients is the brewery, **Brarudi**, which is also a major shareholder in Sosumo, together with the **Societe Burundaise de Financement (SBF)** and the Burundi government, which has majority stake.

Brewery

Of Sosumo's estimated 1989 output of 8,000t, 3,000t went to Brarudi. Brarudi's fortunes are on the ascendancy, and the thinking is that Brarudi's success will rub off on Sosumo. Brarudi, which is 60 percent owned by **Heineken** of the Netherlands, produced 950,000 hectolitres of beer and 125,000 hectolitres of soft drinks in 1988, for a total turnover of BuF3.5bn (then \$24.93m) in that year. Once again, the Burundi product is more competitive in neighbouring markets—Brarudi beer is cheaper than the local beers in both Rwanda and the Kivu region of eastern Zaire. Lower transport costs also give the Brarudi beer the upper hand in these two export markets.

In the meantime, the trade balance can be improved by import substitution as well. To this end, Trade Minister Bonaventure Kidwingira has confirmed, Burundi expects in the near future to begin producing more fertiliser locally, from the country's own domestic reserves of phosphates.

*** Strategy To Bolster Coffee Exports Viewed**

34000374B London AFRICAN BUSINESS in English
Jan 90 pp 35-36—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Article by Francois Misser in Bujumbura: "Burundi Acts To Bolster Coffee"]

[Text] A severe drought followed by floods has depressed Burundi's economic performance for 1989 and threatens its prospects for 1990 as well.

For the first time in many years in this usually food self-sufficient country, the government has had to call for international aid.

The deficit in beans, one of the basic staples, is around 50 percent of Burundi's needs. Besides the climate difficulties, the situation has been aggravated by smuggled exports to Rwanda.

Rice Consumption

The authorities intend to tackle the problem in a number of ways, and apart from calls for foreign generosity and imports, they are encouraging the consumption of rice.

However, this means that Burundi will be unable to export surplus rice to Zaire, as it has in previous years.

Coffee—the main cash crop, which provides 85 percent of export revenues, about 45 percent of GDP [gross domestic product] and 30 percent of government revenues—has also been affected by adverse climate conditions. The volume shortfall aggravated the negative impact of the collapse of the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) last July on quotas between world producers and world consumers.

As a consequence, instead of the 35,000 tonnes of arabica forecast for 1989, the **Office des Cultures Industrielles du Burundi (Ocibu)**, the state-owned coffee board, expects instead 31,000t, according to Ocibu Manager Salvator Nimobona.

Robusta Output

Even though Nimobona expects Burundi's robusta output to be close to the 1989 target of 1,000t, coffee revenues for the year could be as much as 35 percent lower than in 1988.

However, because the 1988 crop was satisfactory (34,000t of arabica and 1,200t of robusta) both in quantity and in price, the effects of the adverse climatic conditions of 1989 won't be felt much before the end of 1990. In fact, coffee should earn the Burundi economy 4.5bn Burundi francs (\$28.5m) in 1990.

Ocibu intends to cope with the decline in coffee revenues in a number of ways. One is to increase production. It started a planting scheme in 1985 which should increase the number of trees from 120m in that year to 180m, by the year 2000. This should enable the annual production of arabica to increase to 45,000t by 1992 and to reach 50,000t within five years.

The total area planted with coffee trees should be extended by 25 percent. Better yields from increased technical assistance and from the supply of pesticides to fight the antheistiosis parasite are expected; the hope is to step up the yield per tree from 350 to 500 grams.

Quality Challenge

The second challenge is to improve the quality. Burundi boasts award-winning arabica, but Ocibu aims to alter the proportion of fully washed coffee (also named Mild Colombian) from 30 percent to 60 percent of production.

To achieve this, 117 washing stations are to be installed throughout the country within the next five years, which represents an investment of BuF5bn (\$31.6m).

In 1984, in a previous effort to boost the quality of its production, Ocibu acquired a sophisticated electronic separator which selects the beans according to their humidity and colour. And the Burundi coffee exporters are quick to point out that rival Rwandese producers don't have such a thing.

The strategy to improve quality also focuses on the transport sector. Burundi wants a faster evacuation to avoid the deterioration of quality which can occur on excessively long trips. This deterioration can knock two US cents off the price fetched for a pound of coffee.

With a view to preventing this deterioration, the Burundi government has asked Tanzania to put new trains into operation between Kigoma and Dar es Salaam. At the moment, the trip between the port of Bujumbura and the port of Dar es Salaam takes an average of one month, as against a week by road.

Burundi's lack of trucks means it can export only 10 percent of its coffee by road. Negotiations are in progress with donors to get them to fund the rehabilitation and maintenance of the road between the two capitals, and to equip the port of Dar es Salaam with new cranes.

Tanzania is currently examining these proposals, but as Burundi already exports all its coffee and other goods via Tanzania anyway, it will continue to do so despite the slow evacuation and the non-asphalted roads, for as long as coffee prices are depressed.

Tanzanian Route

Exports through the Central Corridor to Dar es Salaam are reportedly charged 30 percent less in fees for transport, storage in the port and loading aboard ships than those which take the Northern Corridor route through Kenya to Mombasa.

Then too, efforts are to focus on marketing. Through Burundi's arabicas are used for the best blends, much remains to be done to promote the image of the country's coffee among consumers.

A special effort is to be made to advertise the product among US and Japanese connoisseurs as a high-quality coffee. At present, West Germany takes 60 percent of Burundi's exports, and the Scandinavian countries, Belgium and the Netherlands buy the rest. But the **Burundi Coffee Company (BCC)** intends also to explore the French and the southern European markets.

Russian Customers

Eastern Europe is also on the prospective-client list; the USSR is to purchase some coffee in 1990.

As for 1990, a partial compensation for the difficulties in coffee may be forthcoming from the tea sector. The four factories in the country had a BuF1bn (\$7.12m at the time) turnover for 1988, which meant a profit of BuF189m (then \$1.35m).

A 10 percent increase over the 4,000t produced in 1988 is expected for 1989 as a result of improved storage conditions and higher yields in the areas exploited by the **Office du The du Burundi**.

The positive effects are bolstered by higher prices on the world market, where the price of a pound of Burundi's tea rose from 107.88 UK pence in November 1988 to 187.77 UK pence in November 1989. In comparison, the average price fetched for all of the teas on the London market rose from 109.27 UK pence per pound up to 154.48 UK pence per pound over the same year-long period.

Cameroon

* More Asian Imports, Industrialists in Economy

34190043B Paris *MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS* in French 1 Dec 89 pp 3318-3320
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[Excerpts] According to a French business source, by increasing relatively regularly the participation of Asian countries (except for Japan), in the total amount of Cameroonian imports, Asia has become an important [trading] partner for Cameroon.

Asia's importance has been enhanced even more by the increasingly large number of its nationals who have established themselves in Cameroon in both industrial and business fields. The place acquired in the Cameroonian economy by such countries as Pakistan, India, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, China, South Korea, Taiwan, and even Hong Kong, is all the more remarkable given this time of crisis and a reduction in purchases from abroad when most traditional Cameroonian suppliers are withdrawing from the scene.

Asia: A Beneficiary in Its Trade

Less affected by the crisis than other Cameroonian partners because of the structure of its commerce, Asia is the beneficiary in its trade with Cameroon. Asia's share in Cameroonian imports has increased given the fact that it represented (except for Japan) 4.4 percent of Cameroonian imports in 1985. In 1988, despite a drop in absolute value of close to 20 percent compared to 1987, its share amounted to 5.7 percent composed mainly of textile products (43 percent), electric or electronic machinery or appliances (16.5 percent), and rice (15.1 percent).

Table 1
Imports (in millions of CFA francs)

Country	1988	1987
Pakistan	5,863	4,521
India	592	1,508
Thailand	1,986	1,579
Indonesia	137	27

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Table 1
Imports (in millions of CFA francs) (Continued)

Country	1988	1987
Malasia	170	73
Singapore	412	573
China	2,842	4,236
South Korea	2,911	4,593
Taiwan	5,089	7,722
Hong Kong	1,694	1,956
Total (except for Japan)	21,696	26,788
Percent of Overall Cameroonian Imports	5.73	5.09

[Note: 1985 and 1986 columns omitted]

The improvement in the relative position of Asian countries in Cameroonian imports can be explained by the fact that their exports, within the context of an overall drop in imports by the country, concerns mainly products of prime necessity such as textiles and rice whose purchases, despite the crisis, cannot be reduced except with some difficulty and for which no local substitutes exist at equivalent prices. The absence of effective customs protection for competitive products and the predominance of new industrialized countries in electronics products have resulted in opening Cameroon up to Asian products.

Thus, in 1988, 42 percent of South Korean sales concerned electric machinery and appliances and 31 percent (911 million CFA [African Financial Community] francs) in textile goods while 69 percent of Pakistani sales to Cameroon (4 billion CFA francs) dealt with unbleached nonmercerized cotton fabric and 27 percent whole grain rice. In 1988, 67 percent of Thai sales (1.3 billion CFA francs) were also in the same latter sector. Finally, textile products represented, in that same period, 48 percent of Taiwanese sales (2.4 billion CFA francs).

Table 2
Exports (in millions of CFA francs)

Country	1988	1987
Pakistan	2	66
India	190	-
Thailand	-	22
Indonesia	10	-
Malasia	-	-
Singapore	349	107
China	726	-
South Korea	82	572
Taiwan	2,097	920
Hong Kong	-	-

Table 2
Exports (in millions of CFA francs) (Continued)

Country	1988	1987
Total, except for Japan	3,454	1,687
Percent of Overall Cameroonian Exports	1.26	0.68

[Note: 1985 and 1986 columns omitted]

Cameroonian exports to Asia, on the other hand, are much lower and involve only unprocessed raw materials (see Table 2). Overall Cameroonian exports to Asia (except Japan) amounted to 3.4 billion CFA francs in 1988 of which more than 60 percent went to Taiwan (mainly cotton that returns to Cameroon once processed). The PRC accounts for 21 percent of Cameroonian exports (cocoa products). Taking into account the distinctive features of the import of Asian products and the drop in price of unprocessed raw materials (cotton and cocoa) on the world market, it is not, therefore, surprising that the balance of trade between Cameroon and Asia appears to be positive for the latter. Each of the Asian countries (except Japan), taken individually, shows a surplus in its trade with Cameroon (see Table 3).

Table 3
Balance

Country	1988	1987
Thailand	1,986	1,557
Singapore	63	466
South Korea	2,829	4,021
Taiwan	2,992	6,802
Hong Kong	1,694	1,956
Pakistan	5,683	4,454
India	403	1,508
China	2,116	4,236
Indonesia	127	27
Malasia	170	73

[Note: 1985 and 1986 columns omitted]

Trade, a Family Business

Alongside its good trade record with Cameroon, Asia is equally present in the country's economy through the presence of its nationals. The success of the Indian and Pakistani communities in the field of retail business can be explained by the flimsiness of structures that helps in limiting operating costs (limited infrastructure, very little manpower that works almost autarkically). Moreover, the way Indian and Pakistani merchants are supplied seems to largely avoid conventional trade circuits, derived rather from the underground economy and thus escaping certain restraints. Thus, widely distributed items such as soap, beauty products and perfumes,

detergents, rope, fishing line, storm lanterns, and enamel goods are imported from neighboring Nigeria at very competitive prices due to the depreciation of the naira and the openness of the border between Cameroon and Nigeria. Imports "via suitcases" are reportedly equally frequent especially with regard to shoes.

In the field of electronics (high fidelity television and videos from southeast Asia), these same merchants have at their disposal an original form of organization founded on a network of agents, more often than not family members, established in supplier countries (mainly Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia). The latter bring together goods at very low prices (unsold stock, low grade merchandise, etc.) and centralize orders in order to benefit from substantial reductions. Under invoicing of these goods as well as the selection of an advantageous customs office for the importer also help in significantly reducing taxes when coming into Cameroon.

Consequently, prices can be 15 to 40 percent lower than those found in more official circles, which has created some uneasiness for local as well as foreign merchants established locally that are incapable of offering goods at the same price.

Increase in Industrial Establishments

Alongside business establishments, a certain number of industrial establishments have also developed. In this also the Indian subcontinent predominates. We can thus cite such companies as Camsteel (India, sheet metal and metallic tubing); Camelcab (India, electric cable); Sicabo (India, textiles); SICCIP (Hong Kong, plastic shoes); Metropolitan Plastics (Pakistan, plastic goods); as well as Ranbaxy (India, pharmaceutical products). These industrial establishments do pose certain problems unlike similar business establishments. Indian and Pakistani corporations have profited, by establishing themselves in Cameroon, from favorable conditions offered to them by the Cameroonian state that wanted to attract foreign capital and to develop its industrial infrastructure. Thus, the traditional Cameroonian textile sector, represented by Cicam, has had to face up to competition from Sicabo that manufactures loincloths from unbleached fabric imported from Pakistan at world prices about 50 percent lower than the price of Cameroonian cotton used by Cicam. No concrete measures have yet been taken by authorities to force Sicabo to stock up, at least partially, in local raw materials.

As for Camelcab, it has received complete customs protection for its soldering rods and is consequently entitled to issue shortage certificates to permit the import of such products that cannot, it seems, be manufactured in its plant in Cameroon. This allows it to control the import of products coming under customs tariff regulations and gives it a certain weight vis-a-vis its

direct competitor, Saticam Camoa. Such complete customs protection measures also apply to electric cable and sheet metal destined for the construction industry (Camsteel).

Overall, the Indian and Pakistani community, essentially located in Douala, has a yearly sales volume of more than 10 billion CFA francs and employs approximately 1,000 Cameroonians, of whom a little more than 500 work in industry, thus refuting the complaint that the Indians and Pakistanis work only among themselves.

Chad

* President Habre's New Challenges for Stability

90EF0212A Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French
29 Jan 90 pp 38-39—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Article by Siradiou Diallo: "Habre's Long Journey"]

[Text] On 22 December 1989, Hissein Habre was officially installed as the president of the Republic of Chad for a seven-year term, the first of a maximum of two possible terms. (See JEUNE AFRIQUE, 1 January 1990.) His accession to the highest office in the land was the logical culmination of a referendum held 12 days earlier. On the eve of the voting, I had two long interviews with Chad's head of state. During my stay in Ndjamen, I met with many other prominent Chadians—ministers, high-ranking civil servants, and professionals. I did a great deal of looking around, listening, and observing.

From this visit, I learned that Chadians are more decided than ever to bandage the wounds of their 20-year fratricidal war that disorganized, ravaged, and spilled the blood of their country. I also learned that the overwhelming majority of Chadians are determined to exorcise the shadow of their civil war. In fact, an almost obsessive memory of internal clashes prevented members of the constitutional committee drafting the country's fundamental laws from adopting a multiparty system toward which most of the constituents were naturally inclined. However, the multiparty system has not been ruled out institutionally. Because the wounds of division are still too fresh, a consensus emerged in favor of postponing democratic pluralism to "a later time." It is to be hoped that "later" will not become "never"!

Meanwhile, Hissein Habre has been given full powers for governing. With his hair prematurely turned white under his ever present white cap, his piercing look, his willful chin, the former army leader seems to be making the transition to state leader with no trouble. One would have expected a very proud, self-confident (if not arrogant) man, given his spectacular victories, particularly in recent years: First of all, in military affairs, he managed to kick the Libyan Army out of Chad against all expectations. Indeed, thanks to his daring, the names of such locales as Abeche, Ouadi-Doum, Faya-Largeau, Korotero, now resonate with the sound of victory.

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In domestic affairs, the extent to which national reconciliation has advanced can be seen at any reception, public meeting, or traditional ceremony in Ndjamen. Men who not long ago were fighting each other on the stony ground of Borkou, Ennedi, or Tibesti can now be seen standing or sitting at each other's side, chatting like old, inseparable friends.

Their names are Acheikh Ibn Oumar, Djibril Negue Djogo, Facho Balaam, and Wadal Abdelkader Kamougue, to name only four out of many others. They currently hold seats in the government at the side of Hissein Habre. These were men who spoke through their weapons long before sitting down at the negotiating table. Only two remain absent today: Goukouni Weddeye and Felix Malloum.

Goukouni Weddeye lives in Tripoli where he continues to insist on a meeting of the former heads of all movements, the formation of a national unity government and fair representation in government, in the Army and in the civil service for every point of view. Felix Malloum, after the collapse of the Lagos accords (24 March 1979), has lived in asylum in the Nigerian capital where he has isolated himself in dignified and eloquent silence. But the present leader of Chad has not given up hope of bringing these two former heads of state back into the fold to complete the nation's unity, or at least that is his wish. Discreetly, contacts are maintained with both of them. They have been promised that they will be treated with the dignity and honor befitting their former positions if they return to Ndjamen.

Finally, in diplomatic affairs, Chad's head of state not only managed to consolidate his standing with traditional friends, but also considerably broadened the scope of his relations around the world. Chad is no longer avoided or ignored: On the contrary, all capitals, large and small, are working to maintain as close a relationship as possible with Ndjamen.

Colonel al-Qadhdhafi himself re-established diplomatic relations with Hissein Habre in October 1988. But there are those in Habre's entourage who remain convinced that although the feisty colonel may have changed his methods and tactics, he has not renounced—and will never renounce—his strategy and his objective, i.e., to divide and weaken Chad, the better to rule it.

It is said in Ndjamen that the Libyan leader's expansionist ambitions are based on a deeply rooted, although anachronistic, conviction or a collective idea unconsciously held by a certain class of Libyans who believe they should rule the blacks. Hence, the profound distrust felt by Chadians toward their northern neighbors.

The distrust is so strong that they refuse to release the hundreds of Libyan prisoners of war they are holding, despite pressure from many sources to do so. The release of these prisoners is called for in the Algiers accords between Libya and Chad (31 August 1989). But—as the

reply goes in Ndjamen—these prisoners were captured in a war brought on by the Libyan Army's occupation of Chadian soil.

Thus, the release of prisoners depends on the total and unconditional withdrawal of Libya from Chadian soil, in other words, from the famous Aouzou strip, now the only part of Chad still occupied by Libyan troops. Chad's leaders are so sure of being within their rights that they are at times irritated by the insistence of friends who recommend a quick and definitive settlement of the conflict between Chad and Libya. They fall short of accusing those friends of betrayal, or at least political myopia, given the stakes in the conflict.

As proof that al-Qadhdhafi has not given up his ambitions despite the Algiers accords, they cite the military activities of the former commander in chief of the Chadian Army, Idriss Deby, who turned dissident in April 1989 and sought refuge in Libya. Supported by men recruited in Libya, armed, equipped and financed by the government in Tripoli, Idriss Deby is setting up a base of operations in Sudan.

Thanks to logistics supplied by the Libyan Army, Idriss Deby established himself in Bami and Emrou. There, in late October 1989, he waged bloody battles against the Chadian Army that at that time did not hesitate to penetrate more than 200 kilometers into Sudanese territory, all with the tacit approval of the government in Khartoum, clearly incapable of controlling the activities of the Chadian opposition across the province of Darfour that borders on Chad.

The attitude of France, Chad's traditional and unavoidable ally, is seen by Ndjamen as ambiguous in this affair. While maintaining a military contingent of 1,300 men in Chad, with sophisticated air support from the Jaguar, Breguet Atlantic and other Mirage-type aircraft, Paris seems in a hurry to renew ties to Tripoli, in the view of Chadian leaders. No doubt, they add, France wants to become involved in more lucrative business than military aid to Chad.

This suspicion—recently revived when France considered delivering three "Mirage" aircraft that Libya had bought and paid for long ago—is responsible for the heavy air of distrust that hangs over Paris and Ndjamen, a situation that is not unlike the recall of Colonel Poncet, commander of the French military operation known as "Epervier" [Operation Sparrowhawk] in August 1989 and his replacement by Colonel Job. According to certain Chadian leaders, military cooperation between Paris and Ndjamen is strained by the "colonial mentality" of some French officers, their "narrowmindedness" and "pettiness."

Despite these tensions, Hissein Habre displays a sense of calm, poise, and even genuine ease to his visitors. And when he is asked about his great feats of war, he responds with a great deal of reserve and a certain modesty. Convinced that he now has his country's affairs well in hand, he has set new goals for himself: reconstruction,

development and peace. Without a doubt, these three new challenges will be even more arduous than the challenges of armed combat that the former rebel overcame only a short time ago.

*** Habre Seeks Normalcy, Battles Dissidents**

90EF0172A Paris LE NOUVEL AFRIQUE ASIE in French Dec 89 pp 40-41—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Article by Ali Saleh: "Chad: Between Dialogue and Conflict"]

[Text] Chad has certainly had a hard time maintaining peace. The cease-fire agreement between Djamena and Tripoli on 11 September 1987, the signature on 31 August 1989 in Algiers of a master plan for a peaceful settlement to the border conflict, and the rallying of the major opposition figures to Hissein Habre's side were all factors that would have seemed to predict a long period of quiet for a battered Chad that really needed it.

That was without counting on the dissent of two close companions of the Chadian head of state, Hassan Djamouss and Idriss Deby, both former commanders in chief of the national army.

According to the official version, on 1 April 1989, the two men attempted a putsch that came to an abrupt end, causing the death of Hassan Djamouss. Idriss Deby managed to escape the troops that were sent after him and found refuge in Sudan with some of his men. He is the one who initiated the violent conflicts with the regular Chadian army on 16 and 17 October that caused the death of hundreds of persons along the Sudanese-Chadian border in the Darfour region. Djamena quickly saw the hand of Libya in this attack through the famous "Islamic legion." The Libyans, as usual, denied this vigorously. According to official Chadian circles, the government in Djamena had received information that there was going to be an attack against Chad from the east. To carry out this attack, Chadian dissidents received weapons and money from the new Sudanese regime. In these circumstances, the Chadian army decided to take the initiative. Some troops that were travelling to meet the rebels fell into an ambush in the mountainous region of Bamissi in which 50 soldiers were killed and a hundred wounded. On 18 and 19 October, after long hours of fighting, the Chadian army managed to dislodge the assailants from their high perches. It forced them to take refuge in caves where, according to an official Chadian source, the Libyans dropped arms and supplies to them.

When reinforcements arrived on 29 October, the regular troops attacked, destroying 80 percent of the forces initially estimated to number 2,000 men. The survivors headed towards Kouffra in Libya.

Although neither side is disputing the Algiers agreements, at least for the moment, it is obvious that it has been difficult for the two capitals in question to establish

a trusting, good-neighbor relationship. Distrust is still the rule. It cannot be otherwise until there is a final and internationally recognized solution to the question of the Aouzou gang. Moreover, this problem is closely linked to the matter of the 1,500 to 2,000 Libyan prisoners of war held by Djamena. The Chadian Government does not appear to be in any hurry to release them since, in all the haggling over the northern borders, they are a sort of trading currency. When you know how sensitive Libyan public opinion is to the issue of the prisoners, you realize that they are an important means for exerting pressure.

Distrust Remains the Rule

Another factor that influences the conflict between Chad and Libya is that Hissein Habre and Colonel Qadhafi have never seen eye to eye. Geopolitical requirements doom the two men and their regimes to coexistence of course, but no more. Their relations will never be friendly. Hissein Habre's distrustful nationalism conflicts with Libya's tendency to claim the right to keep an eye on Chadian affairs, a habit that has gone on for a long time by virtue of the support Tripoli has always lavished on various Chadian liberation movements.

Despite a marked imbalance of financial and military resources in Libya's favor, Chad has held up its end in its conflicts with Tripoli, defeating the Libyan war machine and coming out on top diplomatically.

Under these circumstances, the temptation may be great for the Libyan leaders to secretly support Habre's adversaries in order to undermine his regime from the inside, to weaken him, and to bring him to negotiations from a position of weakness. In this subtle chess game, the adversaries immediately take advantage of any failings. In this connection, the defection of Hassan Djamouss and Idriss Deby is a thorn in Habre's side. That Libya, profiting from this situation, tried to push its advantage seems probable. Djamena, for its part, believes this to be true and accuses Colonel Messaoud of the Libyan special services of being the person behind the 1 April rebellion and the recent resurgences of violence.

Subtle Chess Game

It is a fact that because of the character of the two dissident leaders, the incident is likely to cause some embarrassment in the Chadian capital. Both are valiant soldiers who, in their time, played a decisive role in victorious battles against the Libyans in the vast northern region of Chad and who have up to now shown an undying loyalty. Why did they suddenly change over to the anti-Habre camp?

There are conflicting explanations put forward to explain this about-face. According to some circles of Chadian exiles, Habre, who owes the consolidation of his power to the two military leaders, finally took offense at the prestige they gained as a result of their victories in the BET (Bornou, Ennedi, Tibesti) desert. Viewing them as potential rivals, the Chadian chief of state was planning to reduce their influence and then to get rid of them.

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It was to escape the fate reserved for them that the two men decided to flee to Sudan with their loyal troops. During this escapade, Djamouss was wounded and captured, before dying in Djamena's military hospital. For the authorities, unmeasured ambition is at the source of the action of the two men, who are, nonetheless, covered with honors and privileges. The arrival of newcomers on the political scene, after various attempts to negotiate reconciliation, did not jeopardize their positions. This is why their "betrayal" is inexplicable officially.... Unless the Libyans were involved in it. An aggravating circumstance is that they have been accused of giving a tribal dimension to their rebellion. It is true that the two men, originally from Ennedi, belong to the Zakawas tribe, which forms the bulk of the Chadian colony in Sudan. It is not by chance that this is the breeding ground where Idriss Deby went to recruit fresh troops, playing on the supposed ostracism by the government of which the Zakawas are victims. As far as the government is concerned, these accusations are all complete fabrications and just serve as alibis for their subversive plots.

Draft Constitution

The issue is now to find out whether the new Chadian rebellion is capable of forming a fixation abscess on the Sudanese border, or whether it will instead be resolved by the aggressive thrusts of the Chadian army. Developments in the situation in the coming weeks will determine the future of the Algiers agreement that is not threatened for the time being, if the protagonists are to be believed. While these events are taking place, Chad has, at the same time, started moving towards a new constitutional system. Since 1982 political life in the country has been governed by the fundamental act of the Republic. In July 1988, a constitutional committee was set up to draft a new fundamental law. On 13 June 1989, it submitted its draft constitution to the government and the National Consultative Council taking the place of parliament. Between now and the end of the year there will be a referendum on the constitution, together with a plebiscite on a seven-year term for the president of the Republic, renewable one time. The people are going to be going to the polls. The new constitution stipulates a separation of powers and guarantees the fundamental freedoms. It does not make the UNIR (National Union for the Independence of the Republic) a government party and does not formally exclude pluralism in the future, "if conditions lend themselves to it." UNIR is a political grouping in which different currents of thought coexist. So Chad walks a line between war and peace. We only hope that peace will win out in the end.

Congo*** 1989 Party Congress Looks at Gradual Change**

90EF0205A Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French
15 Jan 90 pp 44-47—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Article by Senne Andriamirado: "The Congo: Perestroika in Central Africa"; first paragraph is JEUNE AFRIQUE introduction; passages with brackets supplied by publisher]

[Text] Now 20 years old, the Congolese Labor Party is being called on to change the way it speaks.

Now that it is exactly 20 years old, the Congolese Labor Party (PCT) is recreating its youth. Having been founded on 30 December 1969, at the same time that the People's Republic of the Congo was proclaimed, today it looks like a granddad among African "Labor" parties—that is, those claiming to be officially Marxist-Leninist. As if to prepare the some 10,000 comrade-members for a Congolese style perestroika, on 27 November General Denis Sassou Nguesso, the Congolese head of state and the PCT secretary general, publicly invited the Central Committee to "analyze with intelligence and discernment" the changes under way in Eastern Europe that should shed "light on [our] own struggle, [which] has never been and should never be disconnected from events experienced elsewhere."

This talk has not yet had time to catch on, but, in a nutshell, it means: we Congolese as well are entering a period of change, like all the peoples of the world, and, in particular, our European comrades. In a word, the winds of perestroika are blowing on the banks of the Congo River and even in the equatorial forest.

To be sure, the PCT has not jumped on the bandwagon while a catastrophe was brewing. Officially this initiative began at the fourth congress in July 1989, with what is being called in Brazzaville a "purge." After having seen his friends on the Politburo leave one year earlier in this clean-up, including Pierre Nze together with Antoine Ndinga Oba, the minister of foreign affairs and a very close associate of Sassou Nguesso's, so as to make "the pill" go down more smoothly—Camille Bongou, the hard-line (if not purely) orthodox leader was also kicked off the Central Committee.

A former Politburo secretary in charge of ideology then organizational matters, Camille Bongou is a doctrinaire adherent of Marxist-Castroism, that school of thought which led to the 22 February 1972 attempted coup d'etat by militia members trained and armed by the Cubans

and led by the legendary Captain Ange Diawara against Commandant Marien Nguabi's government, which was held to be excessively "middle class."

Hardest of Hardliners Out

After Diawara's assassination in March 1977 and the interregnum of the Military Committee and the party led by General Joachim Yhombi Opanto, when Denis Sassou Nguesso took power in February 1979, he proposed peace to all parties. And he appealed to backers of Diawara—who had been killed in 1973—who had regrouped themselves into M-22, an underground movement so called to remember the attempted coup of 22 February 1972: among these were Camille Bongou, Pierre Nze, the longtime minister of foreign affairs, and Jean-Jules Okabando, who, as mayor of Brazzaville, would be the sole "surviving" clan member.

But this peace proved merely to be a cold war, a cohabitation of comrade-enemies who constantly kept watch on one another. Rooted in its ideological certainties, over the years—and throughout the economic crisis—the hard-line group became progressively more isolated. At official ceremonies, Camille Bongou systematically withdrew into his own corner, holding himself aloof from (or being avoided by?) the other members of the Politburo. Nevertheless, as a boss among bosses, he saw his powers shrink: he witnessed the removal of a number of faithful M-22 members, he lost his responsibility for ideology, ending up only with organizational matters. And he ended up having nothing whatsoever to do.

After its July 1989 congress, the PCT, which had formerly been monolithic, closed, and omnipotent, undertook an accelerated process of opening up. Naturally its own internal structures—the congresses, the Central Committee, and the Politburo—were still reserved for its 10,000 hand-picked members (representing 0.2 percent of the population). But state structures began to open to those who were not "comrade-members." So the party, as usual the only one to slate candidates (and thus the winners-to-be) in elections for the legislature, slated members of the clergy, businessmen, and labor union leaders who were not PCT militants. Eighty percent of the membership of the National People's Assembly was new, and out of 133 deputies only 59 are party members. In mid-November, all of those elected were asked by Denis Sassou Nguesso to "introduce genuine transparency into debates" and "to challenge the government in a constructive way." This is a first in the microcosm of African political parties calling themselves "Marxist-Leninist."

As an immediate corollary to this process of opening up, the National Assembly will, henceforth, be granted a certain "oversight power," although to be sure this power has not yet been defined. But to start with, this prospect is a gaping hole in the fortress of the party's omnipotent and feared Oversight and Verification Commission that used to intervene at any moment, on any

issue whatsoever, and with respect to and against (almost) anybody. As in all Marxist-Leninist-style parties, this commission was supposed to discourage stray deviationist impulses—even individual ones.

People's Burden

With these tremors shaking the monolithic political wall have come steps in the direction of economic openness. In its 20 years, the People's Republic of the Congo has learned much and had rude awakenings. This country, two-thirds of whose population lives along the 511 kilometer-long Congo-Ocean railroad and particularly around the three cities of Brazzaville, Loubomo, and Pointe-Noire, still satisfies 80 percent of its food needs with imports. The early eighties saw the need to turn to imports of food worsen: the pot of petroleum gold seemed like a final solution. The drop in the price of oil and the plunge in the strength of the dollar soon brought the Congolese to their senses. The 1987 budget was cut in half in relation to 1986's. The ambitious five-year plan for the period 1982-1986, which had foreseen investments of close to 1,000 billion CFA [African Financial Community] francs, was scrapped de facto when it was corrected and reduced to more realistic proportions. Only necessary roads remained a top priority: the link between the Congo-Ocean railroad (modernized), the river highway, and the network of roads needed to make areas in the north accessible are certainly among the aims that the PCT has realized.

But the state-run companies, long viewed as "popular assets," became the "people's burden." Agriculture stood still. Development of mineral resources other than petroleum remained at the planning stage. And in particular, the state, as the only true employer, was no longer able to promise a socialist paradise. And the Congolese have been terribly slow to realize that they can no longer expect everything from the state: in other places students do not receive scholarships (not even in China!), in other places the civil service is the least productive; here, the illusion of paradise deceived the people.

Beginning in 1987, some top Congolese businessmen, who up to that point had only invested in "unprofitable schemes" and the bureaucratic tangle or the import-without-export industry, began to look at agriculture. They worked in the fields and planted manioc, corn, bananas, and tomatoes; they bought pirogues and recruited...Zairian fishermen to pull fish out of the river, which the Congo and Zaire have shared for thousands of years. Small agricultural projects launched personally by Denis Sassou Nguesso have been turned over to cooperatives of young people in Oyo—the chief of state's home village—and on the island of Mbamou, with the help of Moroccan experts. And, at the end of November 1989, major projects began to surface.

Gilbert Salomon, the president and director general of Optorg, a French group, was in Brazzaville taking part in a week of economic discussions with the Congolese

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Government; he said he was ready to invest in agro-industrial projects. Also that same week, Charles Baysse, a Swiss banker from the Financial Banking Corporation of Geneva, which had already underwritten financing in Togo, said he was prepared to provide financing in...Benin, met with Congolese leaders and seemed encouraged by prospects that were opening up.

Utmost Mistrust

And finally—still at the end of November—Philippe Lalonde, the vice president of the Canadian Lavallin group, received assurances from the Congolese government that he would have full discretion to finish building roads to make the center and the north [of the country] accessible. As the tool (if not the artisan) of this opening up towards the international business world—the capitalist business world, it should be added—Prime Minister Alphonse Poaty-Souchlaty has, nevertheless, been strongly criticized in the crypts of the Marxist-Leninist church. He is not even being accused of “treason,” since he only rejoined the PCT in 1979, i.e., when “everything was going fine,” after Sassou Nguesso had taken over. But he is being accused of having “made three leaps all at once.” He has, in fact, accomplished the historic feat of getting onto the party’s Central Committee in July 1989, simultaneously onto the Politburo, and, on 13 August, of being named prime minister.

The old guard views him as an upstart. And furthermore, they have not laid down their weapons. Camille Bongou is no longer among the leaders; Pierre Nze has been appointed the ambassador to...Romania, Robert Ngoua the ambassador to Addis Ababa, and Jean-Nicolas Obembe, the former “boss” of the Press and Propaganda Commission (in other words, censorship) the ambassador to the German Democratic Republic. But their subordinates are still there. They are seething and on edge as they more or less publicly produce calls for a return to order. An editorial dated 21 October 1989 in ETUMBA, the PCT’s central mouthpiece, is significant in this regard.

Signed by the newspaper’s director, the very clever Dominique Mbangou, a member of the redoubtable Press and Propaganda Commission, and skillfully devoted to the subject of the foreign press, this text sets matters straight: if the foreign journalist, it says, has “heard it said that in the country [...] he is traveling to the government is turning pink or blue, all this journalist need do in the course of a reception is see a party leader in cordial discussion with a West European diplomat to see that his information is correct and to serve it up hot and spicy.” “If perchance,” it continues, “he were to observe that in this same African country such and such a state business had opened its capital up to the private

sector or had been transferred to a private individual, there you have it, yet another proof. And if, in the words of the head of this same African country, there were to be found a criticism of the state’s productive sector, no matter how objective, courageous or constructive, that would be the ticket! Our journalist would then write a fine article that concentrated on ‘liberalization,’ the ‘failure’ of the state sector, the ‘death of socialism,’ etc.”

Thus Congolese-style perestroika appears to be starting with heightened vigilance on all parts. President Denis Sassou Nguesso is the first one to have grasped the situation. Neither dogmatic nor doctrinaire, the Congolese chief of state has governed in the open for 10 years. On his left, he has been marked by party ideologues and rhetoricians; on his right, he has been made to feel awkward by some competitors often motivated by other than ideological designs; and he has always known he was being watched. There was a time when Sassou Nguesso made a speech or a statement only if he had the *nihil obstat* of his Politburo comrades.

Party Remains the ‘Guide’

His term as president of the OAU, in 1986-1987, gave him a bit of freedom: as he traveled throughout the world, meeting other people who were not from Africa and not from just the Marxist-Leninist camp, he learned a great deal and retained it. In the process, he put some distance between himself and his domestic impediments.

Now, nearly three years later, urged on by “the socialist fatherland,” Eastern Europe is stirring and marching without shame or a mask towards another form of democracy. It would be ill-advised for Denis Sassou Nguesso not to apply this cardinal principle of Marxism, according to which “the superstructure must be adapted to the infrastructure.” In a word: when historical conditions change, decisions and systems change as a consequence.

But the Congo may not be changing as quickly as Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, or Romania. In Eastern Europe, the primacy of the Communist Party is being questioned. On the banks of the Congo, Sassou Nguesso has stated: “The party is always ready to guide the struggle of our people in a spirit of responsibility that will guarantee a peaceful, free, and democratic process.” When decoded, these words mean quite simply that the Congolese Labor Party remains the only party and remains “the guide.”

This is undoubtedly true because in the Congo there has been no clamor for change in the streets or by any group from among the party’s 10,000 members. But it is an attitude taken by a political leadership that prefers beginning a prudent process of opening up so it will not be overwhelmed tomorrow by the masses.

Gabon*** 1989-1990 Government Economic, Financial Program***** IMF Help, Debt Rescheduling**

34190053A Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Dec 89 pp
3604-3605

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[Text] The International Monetary Fund issued a communique on 18 September announcing a stand-by agreement authorizing the Gabonese Government to purchase a maximum of 43 million SDRs [special drawing rights] from the fund over the next 18 months. The communique makes mention of the fact that the 1989-90 economic program drawn up by the government had been approved in recent months.

It recognizes that since 1986, Gabon has had to endure a considerable deterioration in its terms of trade because of lower oil prices that affected its export earnings and its tax revenues.

Despite a fund-supported program, the drop in prices combined with a large debt service burden and a deterioration in public finances to cause destabilization in macro-economic aggregates, which resulted in a current account deficit.

The goals of the recently approved program are to trim this deficit, to facilitate renewed growth in the nonpetroleum sector and, to contain inflation. In order to accomplish this, a number of measures will have to be taken with regard to demand management and institutions. Consequently, there is a need to impart new vigor to the private sector by pursuing economic liberalization begun under the preceding program and to restore state-run enterprises to health.

Demand management entails tax adjustments and the adoption of a realistic investment program. It will also be necessary to implement a restrictive credit policy with regard to government recourse to credit and to pursue appropriate foreign debt management.

A great deal of time may be required to execute the segment of the program calling for private sector expansion and public sector rehabilitation. Moreover, the international organizations recognize the fact that Gabon's high labor costs are a hindrance to private sector growth. The same is no doubt true of the number of salaried employees in public sector enterprises.

At the financial level, budgetary policy seems to be on the right track: After obtaining its planned reduction in the 1989 deficit, the Gabonese Government will attempt to stabilize operating expenditures (the wage bill, in particular, which has stood at about 104 billion CFA [African Financial Community] francs) and to give priority to investments in the productive sector (essentially agriculture and infrastructure).

The budget deficit could drop to 40 billion CFA francs in 1990 (as compared with the estimate of 54.2 billion for 1989) without any arrears, an important and characteristic element in the execution of any recovery plan. In the same vein, the government's recourse to domestic credit would be limited.

Concerning the Gabon's current account, it is estimated that increased oil revenues should make it possible to reduce the deficit despite increased debt payments. An optimistic estimate of 16 billion has been made for 1990 (as compared with 100 billion in 1989). In addition, reserves will be allowed to continue to build. For this reason, no short-term borrowing is planned and medium- and long-term borrowing will be limited.

With regard to credit, the government is expected to pursue its restrictive policy, but with a slight increase in central bank credit and limited expansion of the money supply. Interest rates are to be set at positive levels in real terms in order to prevent capital flight.

To achieve these objectives, the Government of Gabon will obviously have to be assisted by friendly nations, both in direct or indirect budgetary assistance and in soft-term loans for projects deemed to be productive.

*** Restructuring Parastatals**

34190053B Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Dec 89 pp
3606-3607

—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Text] The goals of the new structural adjustment program for 1989-1991, which was approved by the IMF last September, are to reduce the current account deficit, to contain inflation, and to stimulate an increase in nonpetroleum activities. Various actions have been undertaken to achieve these objectives. Apart from financial measures (budget deficit reduction, tight credit policy, and foreign debt restructuring), a number of structural measures have already been initiated and are being pursued.

Among the structural measures are the restructuring of the parastatal sector and the liberalization of the economic environment. The liberalization policy applies to foreign trade and prices. Imports are no longer subject to quantitative restrictions, which have been replaced by tariff barriers. However, the importation of five sensitive products will be banned in order to protect public investments made in these sectors: sugar, edible oil, soap, mineral water, and cement.

Export taxes have been eliminated, except on wood, mining products and palm oil. Prices have been decontrolled with the exception of certain goods and services of social importance such as water, electricity, local beer, bread, rice, medications, transportation, school supplies, yogurt, gasoline, and the five protected products previously mentioned. In order to enhance the competitiveness of the economy, competition is to be introduced

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among importers, in particular. New sets of investment laws and labor laws have been drawn up. The investment code is aimed at eliminating certain administrative measures that inhibited the development of the private sector. The labor code is aimed at greater flexibility in the employment market. It authorizes the worker and the employer, when economic conditions require it, to enter into an agreement under which the worker is paid on a job-by-job or piece-by-piece basis, at a rate at least equal to that of a worker paid by the hour.

One often deplored aspect of the Gabonese economy is the high cost of business factors, particularly salaries. The monthly minimum wage is about 80,000 CFA francs, well above that of other countries in the region. It should be mentioned that a study on the cost of business factors is soon to be undertaken to determine ways of improving the economy's competitiveness.

An auditing program targeting the parastatal sector was launched in 1987. It involves 34 companies and audits of 32 of them have been completed. The purpose of the program is to restore the financial health of parastatal companies and to make them economically viable. Reorganizations, liquidations, and privatizations are expected to result from the program to which the state appropriated more than 15 billion CFA francs in 1989, including more than 6 billion for the recovery of OCTRA [Trans-Gabonese Railroad Office]. It has set aside 17 billion for the program in 1990.

Fueled by the oil boom, state-run companies experienced rapid expansion in the 1970s as the state invested in the public and parastatal subsectors for social reasons. This sector is characterized by mediocre performance due to immoderate spending, frequent overstaffing as compared to value added, and lax management.

In 1988, the state was a partial owner of 60 companies and sole owner of 26 of them. From a sampling taken of 28 of them, it emerges that their total valued added was 87.4 billion CFA francs in 1987, with a negative result of 18 billion despite 10 billion in state subsidies. The combined wage bill for these companies was 53.8 billion CFA francs in 1987, while their combined staffs numbered more than 16,000 persons.

Five key companies have been given priority: OCTRA, Air Gabon, Gabon Power and Water Company (SEEG), National Timber Company of Gabon (SNBG), and the Postal and Telecommunications Office (OPT-TIG).

A recovery program for OCTRA was approved in December 1988. The audit has already been completed by Price Waterhouse with the recommendation that OCTRA's staff be reduced by 450. The state plans to dismiss only 150 persons, 130 of whom will be rehired by COMILOG [Ogooue Mining Company]. The remainder are either retiring or being offered early retirement. Since September, a 15-percent salary cut has been in effect. At OCTRA, as in most parastatals, the government opted in favor of pay cuts over lay-offs. It is

banking on an upturn in the Gabonese economy as of 1991 and hopes to limit the social costs of structural adjustment.

The state is to sign a program-contract before the end of 1989. OCTRA, which employs nearly 2,000 persons, received 2.8 billion CFA francs in operating subsidies from the state in 1988 and 3.4 billion this year. In addition, the state settled 20 percent of its arrears through the end of 1987. In 1989, OCTRA's loss totaled 3 billion not covered by reserves. To complement reduced spending, a new fare policy is to be proposed.

Air Gabon and the Gabonese state signed a program-contract in September although recovery measures had already been instituted. Prior to the signing of the program-contract, the forecast loss for 1989 totaled 4 billion CFA francs. It has since been brought down to 1.2 billion. The loss is largely attributable to the Lockheed 630 that is unprofitable to operate. Reductions in spending were made possible by the closing of several of the company's representative offices in West Africa, lower aircraft fuel prices, and staff reductions as well as a pay cut pursuant to the 1988 directive to reduce salaries in the parastatal sector by 15 percent. Some 1,500 persons are currently employed by Air Gabon. 65 out of the 150 who were laid off by Air Gabon were rehired by SESAL, an airline catering company with 250 million CFA francs in capital formed in June as a joint venture of Air Gabon and Scrvair.

Air Gabon was granted autonomy to manage its domestic and foreign network. For example, the company is now free to decide whether or not it will continue to offer certain stops.

The reorganization of the Gabon Water and Power Company (SEEG), has run up against an institutional problem: reform of the terms of concession. This is a source of concern for the municipalities of Libreville and Port-Gentil that stand to lose revenues. The SEEG has to reduce its operating costs by cutting back on staff and salaries and by trimming its overhead costs. Over a three-year period, lay-offs could involve 50 employees a year, out of a total of 2,000.

The National Timber Company (SNBG) had a projected loss of 5 billion CFA francs in 1988. The goal of reorganizing the company is to lower its operating costs in order to make wood exports more competitive. Part of the company's equity will be opened up to the private sector. The SNBG will, nonetheless, retain its monopoly on the sale of okoume wood.

The recovery plan for the Postal and Telecommunications Office (OPT-TIG) will be determined at the end of this year, once the government has decided upon the direction of actions to be undertaken.

Various companies have been liquidated: SOTRAVIL [expansion unknown], PETROGAB [Gabonese National Petroleum Company], CODEV [Commerce & Development Organization], SOGACO [Gabonese-Korean

Trading Company?], and SNTH (a hotel sector holding company). The insurance company SONAGAB was acquired by UAP [Insurance Group of Paris], and PIZO [Petroleum Products Distribution Company] was acquired by Shell. Negotiations are under way for the sale of Gabon Forestry Company (CFG) and Gabon-Informatique [data processing]. SOTEGA [expansion unknown] was acquired by private investors.

Follow-up committees have been formed for each company and the overall program is being coordinated by the ministry of parapublic sector reform, which was created in March.

* Smaller Trade Balance

34190053C Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Dec 89 p 3608
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[Excerpt] Gabon's balance of trade remained on the plus side in 1988, whether expressed in F.O.B. [free on board] values (120.4 billion FOB as compared with 166.6 billion in 1987) or in C.I.F. [cost, insurance, freight] values (72.1 billion CIF as compared with 124 billion in 1987). This represents a marked contraction in Gabon's trade surplus, despite the 1987 improvement that followed a severe decline in 1986 brought on by the collapse of the price of oil and the dollar.

Exports lost new ground in 1988 (see table). The drop occurred essentially in oil exports despite an increase in oil production from 7.8 million metric tons in 1987 to 8.1 million. In oil and mining products, exports fell from 83.5 percent of the total in 1987 to 81.3 percent, while imports of these products climbed to about 40 percent of the total (as compared with 30 percent in 1987).

By contrast, improvement was noted in exports of wood, manganese and uranium: Wood exports rose from 46.9 billion in 1987 to 48.3 billion in 1988; manganese and uranium exports rose from 56.4 billion 1987 to 67.1 billion in 1988. The same is true of miscellaneous exports that rose from 17 to 18.1 billion 1988.

Imports and Exports (in billions of CFA francs)

Product	1987	1988
Total Exports	386.6	356.0
Oil	266.3	222.6
Timber	46.9	48.3
Manganese	32.4	45
Uranium	24.0	22.1
Various (BEAC notes, re-exported food products, cocoa, coffee, ivory, hides, textiles)	17.0	18.1
Total Imports	219.9	235.7

Source: BEAC [Bank of Central African States]

[1985 data omitted]

Principal Imports (as a percentage of total C.I.F. value)

Product	1986	1987 (estimated)
Food products	16.2	22.2
Mining products	8.0	2.2
Manufactured goods	24.2	10.9
Construction materials	6.9	1.6
Chemicals	3.0	7.8
Metal products	15.3	34.7
Equipment and tools	16.2	15.7
Various	10.2	4.9
Total	100	100

[1983-1985 data omitted]

Petroleum's Dominant Role

Petroleum continues to dominate exports with 62.5 percent of the total, as compared with 68.9 percent in 1987. Other products saw a slight increase in their share of total exports. The most significant improvement was noted in manganese and uranium that accounted for 18.8 percent of total exports in 1988 as compared with 14.6 percent in 1987.

The "various products" category represented 5.1 percent of total exports in 1988 with 18.1 billion CFA francs as compared with 17 billion in 1987. This category includes re-exported food products, cocoa, coffee, ivory, hides, and textiles, but it is largely made up of BEAC notes. The amount of BEAC notes expended (i.e., Gabonese notes exported) remained almost stable in comparison with their 1987 level of 15.2 billion, while notes imported from other countries rose from 1.5 billion in 1987 to 4.3 billion.

France, Gabon's Leading Client and Supplier

France's Trade with Gabon (in millions of French francs)

Product	1988	1989 (1st 6 months)
Total Imported by France	2,913	1,755
Petroleum	1,253	1,059
Wood	396	238
Manganese	546	192
Uranium	470	151
Fishery products	106	35
Total Exported to Gabon	2,401	1,236
Industrial products including metals and metal products	2,055	1,067
Chemicals and various semi-finished products	266	96
	242	145

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France's Trade with Gabon
(in millions of French francs) (Continued)

Product	1988	1989 (1st 6 months)
Mineral raw materials	2	1
Professional capital goods	870	460
Consumer goods	443	239
Vehicles and spare parts	211	102
Electrical, electronic and household equipment	20	1
Food products	325	15
Energy and related products	18	76
Various products	3	0
Balance	-512	-380
Exports/Imports (percent)	82	70

Source: French Customs Office

[1985 data omitted]

France continues to be Gabon's principal trading partner by far with a 1988 total of 2,913 million French francs in imports from Gabon and 2,410 million in exports to Gabon. Proportionately, France holds a wide lead over Gabon's other main clients, representing 42.7 percent in 1987. France is followed by Italy (8 percent in 1987 as compared with 2.8 percent in 1985), the United States (whose share fell abruptly between 1985 and 1987 from 22.4 percent to 7.2 percent), Japan (4 percent), and West Germany (2 percent).

A similar breakdown is to be found among Gabon's primary suppliers. In 1987, France topped the list (53.6 percent), followed by the United States (8 percent in 1987 as compared with 11 percent in 1985), Japan (6.4 percent), West Germany (5.6 percent as compared with 6.3 percent in 1985), the Netherlands (3.6 percent), Belgium and Italy (3.4 percent) and finally, Great Britain (3.2 percent).

Gabon's exports to France mirror the pattern in Gabon's overall exports (see table). Oil exports hold first place with revenues on the order of 1,253 million French francs in 1988. Manganese, uranium and wood together account for about the same amount, while fishery products seem to have dropped in the first six months of 1989.

Gabon's imports from France involve industrial products to a large extent, particularly professional capital goods. Imports from France totaled 2,401 million French francs in 1988, resulting in a 512-million trade deficit for France. This, nonetheless, represents a marked improvement in France's favor since her 1985 deficit totaled 2,006 million French francs. In addition, the ratio of exports to imports rose from 64.3 percent in 1985 to 82 percent in 1988.

* French Aid for Development

34190053D Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Dec 89 p 3613
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[Article by Isabelle Verdier]

[Excerpt] Not counting the French Treasury's special assistance in public debt rescheduling within the Paris Club (1.1 billion French francs), public aid from France totaled 1.13 billion in 1988, the bulk of it earmarked for the economic development sector. (See table below.) The economic development sector is the beneficiary of many loans, whereas, the sectors of education and culture primarily receive subsidies. Most of the aid goes to mines and petroleum, infrastructure, equipment, transportation, and rural development.

French Public Aid in 1988
(in thousands of French francs)

Sector	Subsidies	SAP ¹ Loans	Total
Education and culture	96,797	6,800	103,597
Economic development	125,608	791,700	917,308
Other sectors	112,624	0	112,624
Total	335,029	798,500	1,133,529

1. Structural Adjustment Program

Source: Cooperation and Cultural Action Mission

N.B. a) Special aid from the French Treasury for the rescheduling of French public debt within the Paris Club: 1,100,000,000 French francs. b) Total guarantees granted by COFACE [French Foreign Trade Insurance Company]: 1,108,806,000 French francs.

Commitments for investment subsidies from France's Aid and Cooperation Fund (FAC) totaled 81,300,510 French francs in 1988 (and 52,283,764 francs in effective payments). Through these funds, France played a role in financially shoring up SONADIG [National Investment Company of Gabon], the construction of the Melen Hospital, the mineral resource survey along the Trans-Gabonese railway, and in financing for the company Africa No. 1, to name the primary projects involved.

France's Central Fund for Economic Cooperation (CCCE) disbursed 798.5 million French francs in 1988 as follows: 152.77 million under the first window, 414.73 million under the second window, and 231 million under the second window as part of the structural adjustment loan.

The largest loans involve the Rabi-Kounga oil field, structural adjustment, the public sector, and the modernization of the Libreville airport. In 1987, the CCCE disbursed 759 million French francs, 112.40 million of which were earmarked for structural adjustment. The small disbursement made by the CCCE in 1986 (225.92 million) is explained in part by the absence of second-window loans for the structural adjustment program.

Guarantees made by COFACE totaled 1.108 billion French francs in 1988, including 1.075 billion for the hydrocarbons sector.

The overall reduction in French technical assistance personnel, which began in 1983, continued in 1988, leveling off at a total of 668 persons (as compared with 716 in 1987). In the area of infrastructure, French technical assistance is involved in the very large investments made by the French state. The small number of Gabonese engineers and technicians graduating from training institutes as compared with the country's needs leaves little hope of further reductions in the short term. While the Gabonese governmental institutions, particularly its financial offices, employ large numbers of cooperation personnel, the same is not true of the productive sectors (mining and agriculture) that continue to be given short shrift in technical assistance.

* Mining Sector Surveyed

34190053E Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Dec 89 pp
3617-3619

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[Excerpts] The mining sector in Gabon centers essentially on the extraction of uranium ore from Mounana and manganese ore from Moanda. Gold found in the provinces of Ngounie, Ogooue-Lolo, Ogooue-Ivindo, and Moyen-Ogooue is exploited on a nonindustrial scale.

Uranium

The Franceville Uranium Mining Company (COMUF) has mined uranium since 1961 when uranium concentrate (yellow cake) was first produced. The company is jointly owned by the Gabonese Government (24.8 percent), the French company MOKTA, a fully owned subsidiary of COGEMA (39 percent), COGEMA [General Nuclear Materials Company] (18.8 percent), Uranium Pechiney (10.6 percent), COFIMER [expansion unknown] (5.8 percent), and by public interests of the Gabonese Government (1 percent).

The production of yellow cake with a 75-percent uranium content has gone from 918 metric tons in 1984 to 939 metric tons in 1985, and from 900 metric tons in 1986 to 794 in 1987 and 904 in 1988.

A production level of 890 metric tons is planned for 1989, for a sales volume of 21 billion CFA francs that represents a decline over last year. The average sales price of a kilogram of uranium is expected to hover at about 25,000 CFA francs.

The product is placed in drums and transported via the Trans-Gabonese railway to the port of Owendo. The deposits in the Franceville region contain an average of three to four kilograms of uranium per metric ton of ore. The Mounana deposit was the first to be mined, but it was depleted in 1975. Mining then began at the Oklo deposit and extended to Okelobondo. The Boyindzi deposit was mined as of late 1980. The extracted ore is

crushed and ground, then processed in a concentration plant near the deposits to increase uranium content to 75 percent.

The reserves at the Mounana deposit represent 15 to 20 years of production. The number of employees has greatly diminished, primarily due to retirements without replacement. Currently, there are about 900 employees.

The company is attempting to optimize its reserves. It, therefore, imposes its own limits on output when the market is unfavorable. Very little investment is being made to open new mines and exploration has practically come to a halt. COMUF invested a great deal between 1984 and 1986 to raise its production capacity from 900 to 1,500 metric tons a year, but when the market collapsed, it was unable to make a return on its outlays.

Under no circumstances is there any question of closing the mine. It is one of the few mines in the Francophone world that makes it strategically important. The coming years will also be difficult ones. Sales have been shrinking in volume for several years and are likely to decrease by 20 percent in 1990.

Since 1986, overproduction of uranium around the world and the resulting drop in prices have curtailed uranium sales. Prices fell 12.5 percent in 1988 over 1987 levels and by 5 to 10 percent in 1989 in comparison with 1988. They are expected to fall another 10 percent in 1990.

This is the second crisis in the uranium market in the history of uranium mining. The first occurred between 1960 and 1974 and was followed by a boom linked to the oil crisis.

The current crisis will probably last until the end of the 1990s when the large stocks of uranium that have been accumulated by producers and consumers will be depleted. There has been no noticeable increase in demand due to the stagnation of nuclear power programs in most of the Western countries, except for France and Japan. The United States, which accounts for one-third of consumption by capitalist countries, has considerable stocks and has closed some of its mines. It is able to make deliveries to Japan by repurchasing some of the stocks held by nuclear power plants that are in need of capital.

COMUF's main clients are COGEMA, Japan, and European countries. Gabon, with its one mine, is the 8th producer among countries with market economies. It is preceded by Canada, the United States, Australia, South Africa, Niger, France, and Namibia.

COMUF has embarked on a policy of diversifying its activities. It is participating in renewed exploration for gold in collaboration with the Gabonese Government and the BRGM [Geological and Mining Prospecting Office]. To date, two or three gold deposits with a total potential of 15 metric tons have been discovered. The discoveries were made possible by about 50 million French francs in investments.

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COMUF is also involved in fruit and vegetables (SOC-IMAG) and in mineral water (EAULECO) in the Haut-Ogooue region.

COMUF's Sales, Profits and Investments

Category	1987	1988
Price of Uranium/Kg in CFA francs	27,995	24,490
Sales volume (millions of CFA francs)	23,992	22,030
Value added (millions of CFA francs)	14,284	11,754
Investments (millions of CFA francs)	1,704	2,146

Source: General Directorate of the Economy

[1984-86 data omitted]

Manganese

Manganese ore is also found in the Haut-Ogooue region, the hub of Gabon's mining sector. The manganese in the Moanda deposit there has been mined by the Ogooue Mining Company (COMILOG) since the beginning of the 1960s.

After South Africa and Brazil, Gabon is the Western world's third-largest producer (all grades of manganese combined), with a stable production level hovering between 2.2 and 2.4 million metric tons a year for the past four years. If only high-grade ore is considered, however, Gabon represents 30 percent of reserves in the Western world. The more than 48-percent manganese content of the Moanda ore makes it a high-grade ore by world production standards.

Gabon has reserves to last 150 years at the current pace of production, which makes it the largest deposit in size and in manganese content.

World Production of Manganese Ore
(all grades combined)

Country	1987	1988
	(in thousands of metric tons)	
Australia	1,680	1,938
Brazil	1,970	2,600
Gabon	2,400	2,250
Ghana	295	300
India	1,200	1,100
South Africa	2,892	3,480
Total, Western world	10,975	12,148
China	1,300	1,300
USSR	9,400	9,200
Total	21,840	22,858

Note: The above totals include the estimated output of small-scale producers

Source: Institute of Manganese

[1984-85 data omitted]

The manganese market is linked to trends in the industries that use it. Ninety percent of manganese is consumed by the steelmaking industry, which uses four to 10 kilograms of manganese per metric ton of steel. The remaining 10 percent goes into making electric batteries and other products. Manganese is not used in its unprocessed state. It must be made into a ferro-alloy, which is the intermediate stage in making steel. For a good quality of steel, ore containing more than 44 percent manganese is required.

The processing is done in the consuming countries, not in Gabon. A COMILOG subsidiary with Gabonese interests, the French Ferro-Manganese Company of Paris Outreau (SFPO) located in Boulogne-sur-mer, produces ferro-manganese from manganese supplied by COMILOG.

The prospects for the manganese market are fairly good, for two reasons: The world steel market is healthy and the Soviet Union, a large consumer, is seeing its own output decrease and is, therefore, expected to become a future buyer, particularly of high-grade ore. Manganese prices, which dropped in 1986 and 1987, have since improved, more than doubling in two years. Prices currently stand at about 3.65 dollars per 10 kilograms delivered to Europe. While 1987 was a difficult year for COMILOG when ore was sold below production costs and large investments were made in the ore-handling port of Owendo, 1988 saw the beginnings of a recovery and 1989 was a good year. The prospects for 1990 are largely dependent upon the needs of the Eastern countries and their ability to make payment.

Prices are expected to remain stable in 1990, although demand may contract slightly along with steel production. However, there are no plans to open new mines and supply should remain unchanged.

The destinations of Gabon's manganese are varied: Primarily, they are West Europe, East Europe (now buying greater amounts), the United States (now buying less), and finally, China and Japan.

Manganese Production and Export by COMILOG

Category	1987	1988
	(in thousands of metric tons)	
Production		
Metallurgic manganese	2,403	2,186
Dioxides	186	68
Deliveries		
Metallurgic manganese	2,102	2,316
Dioxides	188	66

Source: General Directorate of the Economy

[1984-85 data omitted]

COMILOG employs 3,200 persons. Its sales volume this year totals 250 million dollars.

Half of the manganese is transported via cableway to the Congo-Ocean railway, which then takes it the rest of the

distance to the Congolese port of Pointe-Noire. The other half is transported over the Trans-Gabonese railway to the new ore-handling port of Owendo, which was opened in December 1988.

Gold

Gold is currently being produced in nonindustrial scale operations. 1,200 persons using gold washing techniques are known to be working seven different areas. Eteke, Ndan-gui, Makokou, and Longo are the main areas among them.

From 1976 to 1985, production averaged only 50 kilograms a year, after having averaged 400 kilograms a year in the 1940s and 1950s. Since 1986, there has been an upturn in activity. Declared production rose to 62 kilograms in 1986, 78.6 kilograms in 1987 and 137 kilograms in 1988.

The marketing of gold is handled by agents of the ministry of mining who collect the output at different centers. The price is set by the government, but it has not kept pace with the world market price. An unofficial market has, therefore, sprung up alongside the official market. The government is seeking to restrict the unofficial market.

The declared output of gold is used locally. The government is seeking to increase production to 200 kilograms of gold per year. In order to do that, it will first have to organize the gold producers and improve marketing.

Results of the Mineral Survey

In 1981, a program of mineral resource exploration was launched in the areas close to the Trans-Gabonese railway, which would thus provide transportation for any ores produced and generate revenues for OCTRA [Trans-Gabonese Railroad Office]. The area covered in the mining survey extends 1,000 kilometers on either side of the railway, representing two-thirds of the country.

Less than half of the planned 230,000 km² [as published] have been explored. Gabon's general directorate of mining and geology has oversight of the project. The activities are financed by the Gabonese Government with assistance from France's Aid and Cooperation Fund (FAC). France's BRGM provides supervision and training for Gabonese personnel.

Despite the difficulties encountered in the mountainous terrain, which lies in the middle of an equatorial forest crisscrossed by an extensive water network, the findings obtained to date are quite interesting. Not only have the basic geological data been gathered; but exploration has also confirmed the already known gold-bearing areas in the Eteke and Koula-Moutou region and shown them to be larger. In addition, carbonatite rocks rich in niobium, tantalum, and phosphate were also discovered.

Studies are being conducted on niobium and tantalum to find technical solutions to the problem of recovering these two metals from the ore in which they are found. Niobium and tantalum are used in small quantities in advanced technologies. Brazil produces them from a deposit comparable to Gabon's. In the short term, the narrow market for

them and still unresolved technical problems make it impossible to envision mining them in Gabon.

The Gabonese Government has given preference to phosphate with the possibility that an organism responsible for studying mining conditions and market prospects will be created with a view to a possible mining operation. One decisive element is whether competitive production costs can be achieved for phosphate concentrates.

The cost of transportation is fundamental. The Mabounie deposit is located near Lambarene and the output could be transported down the river. Because road transportation is too costly and the railway too far away, river transport seems to be the best solution although dependent upon water levels during the dry season.

One of the advantages to the phosphates found in Mabounie is the absence of magnesium, although buyers would still have to be found. Good quality concentrates can be obtained since they reportedly contain no impurities—in particular, no cadmium, a carcinogen that is banned from importation in certain countries.

The market is not suffering from a penury and prices are changing for the better relative to last year. Whatever the case, production costs will remain the decisive factor. The deposit contains between 40 and 60 million metric tons of phosphate ore and could supply two million metric tons of concentrate a year for a period of 15 to 20 years. The other phosphate-producing countries in Africa are Togo, Senegal, and—largest among them—Morocco.

Enough gold was discovered in the Eteke region to permit renewed production with the participation of COMUF. BRGM is exploring other areas and plans other gold-related activities north of Mitzié.

A deposit of barite was discovered 10 years ago east of Mayumba in southwestern Gabon. A company was to be created by the Gabonese Government with the BRGM, COMILOG, and Elf-Gabon (PID) to mine the deposit under the name of Nyanga Mining Company (CODEMIN). The output was to be used in oil drilling.

However, declining oil exploration programs and the lower price of barite made the prospects of mining this deposit less favorable. In addition, other producers emerged on the world market (China, Korea, Kenya, and Morocco) with competitive prices. Matters have not progressed any further and as long as there is no port in Mayumba, there is little likelihood that the project will be reactivated.

Finally, mining activity at the iron ore deposit in Belinga has been put off until a later date because of the unfavorable trend in the market. It will also depend upon the completion of a segment of the Trans-Gabonese railway for transportation of the ore.

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Democratic Party's Worrall Interviewed on Future
PM0603165890 London THE INDEPENDENT
in English 6 Mar 90 p 14—FOR OFFICIAL USE
ONLY

[Report on interview with Democratic Party co-leader Dennis Worrall by Terry Coleman: "A Vision of the Boers in the Final Homeland"—date and place not given]

[Text] But why, I asked, shouldn't a South Africa with a black political majority go the ruinous way of the 50 black African states to the north?

"Well," said Denis Worrall, "I can't guarantee that it won't. I can't say that. But what I can say is that if we don't adapt, if the whites don't accept the realities, we're guaranteed to go the way of the rest of Africa. There's no question."

"I am saying to white South Africans: 'Get with it. Accept that you're going to have a government with more black faces than white, but what is important is not the colour of their faces but whether the principles and values on which that government is based are democratic and humane.'"

Dr Worrall is co-leader of the Democratic Party, which you could call the descendant of the party of Helen Suzman. It's true that the Democrats are now in trouble because most of their policies have simply been taken over by the reforming National Party. But his opinions have an extra force because of the variety of his international experience. He has taught in American and Nigerian universities. He was a South African senator. He wrote large parts of the new constitution of 1984, and was fed up when it was watered down. He became ambassador to Australia, and then to the Court of St James.

In London he was regularly on the carpet at the Foreign Office, publicly explaining what he privately thought were the too many mistakes of his own government. He considered the South African raids on African National Congress headquarters in Lusaka, Harare, and Gaborone incredible.

So when in 1986 he was offered the post of ambassador to Washington he declined, explaining that he was both spiritually and politically low. But still, he says, Pretoria was surprised when he resigned from London and came home. He stood against a National Party cabinet minister in the 1987 election and came within 39 votes of defeating him. Last year he helped to found the Democratic Party, became co-leader and won a parliamentary seat.

In a way, too, he has the rare ingredient of disinterestedness, because, as he says, he has lived out whatever political ambitions he had. When we met at his house in a pleasant suburb of Cape Town—and it is fact of life that South African liberals have always lived in the most

pleasant places—he said he would happily serve as ambassador again, under a new government.

Now, I asked him, the State President, F.W. de Klerk, had said, in his celebrated speech of last month, that the season of violence was over: was it? "Yes and no. Yes because the ANC no longer needs to batter down the doors. That's over, it's a whole new ball game. But it's an unstoppable process. It could only be stopped at the risk of an enormous increase in violence."

Civil war? "Sure."

Did the National Party have an electoral mandate for what President de Klerk was proposing? He believed that it did not, and that white fears had to be recognised. "The National Party point of view is that whites must be given a special place in the constitution. That's what I think they're gunning for, we say that is a short-term answer, as in Rhodesia—Zimbabwe rather..."

Where things fell apart? "Where things fell apart, because (if that system is adopted) you're committing the whites to being a political minority. We say whites must commit themselves to being part of a political majority, must link up with those blacks who fundamentally share their values, et cetera. I think that is saleable, but it will very much depend on the leadership, and the kind of South Africa which the blacks project."

What the Democrats stand for is one man, one vote, but in a federal state, with a bill of rights. But there were going to be more black faces than white faces in government. He would challenge President de Klerk to deny that. But I had asked, said Dr Worrall, why South Africa should be different from the rest of the continent; he would answer that there was a high proportion of whites, Caucasoids, however you wanted to describe them, and there were roads, and banks, and minerals.

Very well, but was there any precedent for a dominant population surrendering, as was now proposed that it should, the sovereign government of its own territory? He did not think there was. The government had made enormous concessions so far. To unban the ANC, the Pan African Congress and the Communist Party in one sentence was spectacular. "It either implies a tremendous naivete on the part of the government, on the part of de Klerk, or a confidence that he can handle the situation, or it implies a complete under-estimation of the forces that are released."

The last would amount to recklessness? "If it were conscious, but I don't think it is... He recognises that there's a sort of inevitability, that he has to change, that the forces out there are just too strong."

Would some whites just leave? "I've no doubt about it. And many of them will be people who have pleaded for the changes that are taking place."

All right, would Dr Worrall stay, and his children? "Sure. And they will have the advantage, by the way, the

privilege, of living in South Africa without guilt. Generations have grown up with a tremendous sense of guilt."

And he thought that though South Africa did not have such resources that it could just give them away to the rest of Africa, a new South Africa could be a catalyst for change. Already its influence in sub-Saharan Africa was extraordinary, and he would give me a small and droll example. The chief executive of a car rental company had told him a lovely story. They lost a lot of cars which were stolen and driven north. "This guy says: 'We supply the whole of Africa with motor cars.'" So, in a larger way, if they all got their act together, South Africa could be the workshop of Africa.

I asked what Dr Worrall thought of the Conservative Party's demand for partition and his answer—given that he is of English stock and not himself an Afrikaner—was a surprise. He wanted to distinguish between those Afrikaners who would not come to terms at all with the fact that they were in Africa and those nationalists with a small "n" who wanted to preserve their culture, their language, their religion.

"For a start," he said, "one has to recognise that these are the people who can veto the outcome, whatever is agreed to. They've got the guns to do it. They've got the will, the determination—which the national Party, incidentally, has lost. The National Party has lost the will to rule.

"But the Afrikaner nationalist with a small 'n', I understand his position completely, and he's got to bring his interests to the negotiating table. It may even be that he can negotiate some small part of South African state."

Which would be entirely in accord with history, the Boers going off to create their own states? "It would be. I've always argued that things that seem irrational now, like the concept of partition, can in changed circumstances become rational politics."

So they could set up a couple of independent Israels? "Well, this is it. I drive through Pretoria and I look at those blocks of flats at the foot of the Union building—which Alan Paton described as the most majestic building in the continent of Africa. And I look at those flats which are presently occupied by lower-grade civil servants, who are all white. And I think, in the new reality, those places are going to be filled overwhelmingly by blacks. The extent of the change one is talking about is enormous, and I don't think South Africans, many of them, white or black, understand the implications."

Now, he said, if you were to pursue the analogy of Israel and the Diaspora, then you could say that the government's past policy had been to give all people in South Africa their own countries, their own homelands, their own Israels. All people, that was, except for the Afrikaners, who now found themselves in a state where they would be outnumbered. Now take the Conservatives. At the moment they were going through with their protest politics, collecting their million signatures and so on.

"Then they're going to be specific. They're going to say: 'We want our Israel. The rest of the Afrikaners and whites can stay and compete in the diaspora.'"

And he would say to them that they should drop their emphasis on race, white against black, because they had a universally justifiable case in terms of language, culture, and nationalism. The Afrikaner had struggled against the land and against the British, but his history was forgotten by the world. The Afrikaner was now seen as the creator of apartheid and all that, and it was true that there had been an element of idealism that was largely gone.

But he would quote a great Afrikaans poet, N.P. van Wyck Louw, who said that Afrikaners had failed to convey to the world an intellectual justification for their nation, and that for this reason the strivings of Afrikaner nationalism were "so blind, so dumb, and so misunderstood."

For himself, Dr Worrall insisted again that the fears of the whites had to be understood. If Nelson Mandela had asked him, he would have advised him to speak at least three sentences of his first speech in Afrikaans. Some such gesture was essential.

Broadly, Dr Worrall said, he felt more confident now than for some years, but some things ruffled his confidence. He had recently been in Germany and feared that, with the collapse of Eastern Europe, and with the redrawing of the map of Europe, the developed countries were becoming less interested in the Third World, and particularly in Africa.

But surely South Africa was not a Third World country? Dr Worrall said it was not, and it might be an exception. It had gold, diamonds, platinum, uranium.

But plainly, as I understood him, he was thinking ahead and seeing the future of South Africa and of the black states to the north as more tied up together. "Africa is dropping to the bottom. In this sense. Why should West Germans give aid to Ethiopia when they've got East Germany there? Hell, I mean, there's a direct kinship between them. And the rewards of helping East Germany are likely to be so much greater. People have got so pissed off with Africa. Ethiopia—every year there's a bloody crisis, and there's no prospect of improvements, so helping East Germany satisfies the conscience of a rich country."

But as to South Africa, wasn't German business exceptionally strong there, with BMW's everywhere? He agreed, saying there were more German than British companies: business would continue, but what about aid? "South Africa can be an exception to the rest of the continent, but then we've got to grab the imagination quickly, in the next year. I think De Klerk understands that."

And then? Dr Worrall paused a long time, and said: "The United States, Britain, and the European countries must

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understand that the great drama of the last part of the twentieth century is being played out here. It can have a happy denouement."

REUTER Interviews 'Radio Freedom' Officials

MB0203060690 Johannesburg SAPA in English
0255 GMT 2 Mar 90—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[By Brendan Boyle]

[Excerpts] Lusaka, March 2, SAPA-REUTER—Walter Sisulu made the first Radio Freedom broadcast urging guerrilla support for the outlawed African National Congress (ANC) from a clandestine transmitter inside South Africa in 1964.

Now, after more than a quarter of century of broadcasting on the run, the ANC's own radio station could be on the verge of going home from exile.

It is not a question of whether Radio Freedom will continue to broadcast, it is just a question of where, from exile or from home, said information official City Ngubeni, who heads the ANC guerrilla group's radio network.

Radio Freedom's daily one-hour broadcast to South Africa from loaned facilities in Zambia is still prepared on portable equipment in an unobtrusive house hidden behind a high wall and a dull red gate on the outskirts of Lusaka.

The studio could be packed away in minutes.

We are fighting, we are still at war. We have to be vigilant against the Boers (white government forces) in South Africa, said Monwabisi Djasi, one of six refugees who prepare and present the daily programmes from Lusaka.

Sometimes we have had to take our equipment and move fast and it could happen again. You won't find us here in a few months time, said Djasi, a young activist who fled his Southcoast home of Port Elizabeth in South Africa in 1982 to escape arrest. [passage omitted]

And after decades of exhortations to resist white rule and apartheid with boycotts, civil disobedience and armed struggle, Radio Freedom has begun to moderate its message since De Klerk came to power last year.

His speech legalising the ANC took us by surprise, said Sipho Moloto, who fled South Africa after the 1976 Soweto student uprising that claimed more than 600 lives in six months.

We could not continue to use the hostile rhetoric we had used in the past. It would have sounded irrelevant and we knew white people also would be listening to us to hear our response, he said.

Radio Freedom, broadcasting from borrowed state-owned facilities in five countries for a total of about 40

hours a week, has been the main means of contact between the movement's leaders and their supporters in South Africa.

Radio Freedom has been a bridge between the movement and the people. It has told them we were still there even in the most difficult times, said Ngubeni, the liaison official with the ANC's Department of Information and Publishing.

We have never used Radio Freedom to communicate without soldiers in the field, not in the sense of coded messages. But we have used it to pass directives to the people from the leadership, he said.

Ngubeni said the station's success could not be measured by any formal yardstick, but he said the songs sung at rallies and funerals at the height of the 1984/86 uprising in South Africa proved the programmes were being heard.

Most of those songs came from the ANC camps in Tanzania, that is where they were written. We played them over the radio and that's how the people got to know them, he said.

Government jamming has been a regular problem, but the diversity of Radio Freedom's transmissions has helped to overcome the interference.

Jamming is very expensive. They have tended to jam one transmitter so people think we have disappeared, but they have never been able to jam them all, said Djasi.

Radio Freedom, a combination of political commentary, reports from the ANC's headquarters, health and cultural programmes, is continuing to broadcast daily from Zambia, Tanzania, Madagascar, Angola and Ethiopia.

The Lusaka crew hope that soon they will be able to broadcast as former ANC Secretary General Walter Sisulu did days before his arrest, from a base inside South Africa.

*** Electrical Energy: Prospects for Going Nuclear**

90EF0250A Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Jan 90 pp 49-50
—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Article by Mario Sampaio: "Electricity Generation: from Coal to Nuclear"]

[Text] It is an unquestionable fact that South Africa produces more electricity than it consumes. However, 80 percent of that electricity is produced by coal burning generators, and, as they emphasize in Johannesburg, "coal is not like diamonds. It will not last forever."

In effect, although South African coal reserves have been estimated at 115 billion tons, only 20 percent of this total figure consists of high-quality coal, and anthracite coal in particular. However, the present production of this slow burning coal, which generates a great deal of heat, accounts for about one-third of total output. Reserves of

this kind of coal will, therefore, be exhausted more quickly than other varieties of coal. Technical solutions to the problem of the increased use of low-quality coal are currently under study. Moreover, it has been estimated that supplies of coal for electricity generators will not become a problem until the beginning of the 21st century. However, the situation after that point cannot be anticipated at this time.

The Nuclear Solution

ESCOM (Electricity Supply Commission), the South African equivalent of the EDF [French Electric Power Company], has just announced that it has no intention of building a second nuclear-powered electricity generator. However, in view of the time that must elapse between any decision to build such a generator and its entry into service, preliminary studies on the eventual location of a second nuclear-powered electricity generator have already been made. Otto Graupner, ESCOM director for environmental questions, has even stated that these studies began about 10 years ago!

We may recall that the process leading to the construction by French companies of the first South African, nuclear-powered electricity generator at Koeberg, North of Cape Town, began in 1974 with the issuance of a public invitation to bid. The selection of the construction firm was made in 1976 and the generator began to supply electricity in 1984.

As in the case of the Koeberg generator, the site to be chosen for the second nuclear-powered plant will be on the sea coast, because nuclear generators use enormous quantities of water for cooling purposes. As everyone knows, water is not very abundant in the interior of the country. At the same time, the second nuclear-powered electricity generator will be located as far as possible from the eastern Transvaal area, because the greatest concentration of thermal-powered electricity generators, capable of supplying all of the surrounding territories, including Mozambique, is in that region.

Therefore, the ideal site would be in Koeberg. However, ESCOM does not want to put "all of its eggs in one basket." What would happen in case of an accident?

Another site that would meet almost all of the requirements would be in Port Nolloth, near the border with Namibia. However, this has been rejected because it would be too far from the principal South African urban and industrial centers.

ESCOM's preferences could, therefore, be directed to an area South of Humansdorp, not far from the city of Port Elizabeth, on the Indian Ocean coast.

ESCOM technicians are very satisfied with the efficiency of the Koeberg plant, and everything seems to indicate that the next South African nuclear-powered electricity generator will also be French built. This prospect should be no surprise, especially since it was revealed in 1983 that Guy Penne, then adviser to President Francois Mitterrand for African affairs, had written to the Anti-Apartheid Movement, stating that, "following a semi-official approach from ESCOM, Framatome (the principal contractor for the Koeberg plant) had asked the French Government for its views on a possible contract for the construction of a second nuclear-powered electricity generator" in South Africa.

It was learned at that time that the president of ESCOM had approached the French Embassy in Pretoria to confirm South African interest in a new, French-built nuclear-powered electricity generator. The contract for such a generator would reportedly be linked to the construction of several other, thermal powered generators and would be worth several billion U.S. dollars.

An African Electricity Network?

While waiting until this second, nuclear-powered electricity generator is built, ESCOM is trying to export the current surplus of electricity to countries bordering on South Africa. Approaches have reportedly been made to these countries for the establishment of an electricity distribution network in Southern Africa. However, these efforts have always met with a refusal by Zimbabwe to engage in negotiations with Pretoria.

On the other hand the Zimbabwean Government has reportedly contacted the Mozambican Government to buy electricity produced by the hydroelectric generating plant at Cabora-Bassa, about 300 kilometers in a direct line from Harare.

In principle, the electricity produced at Cabora-Bassa "belongs" to South Africa, which contributed most of the financing for its construction. However, the Republic of South Africa has not been able to use this electricity, because RENAMO [Mozambique National Resistance movement] has regularly sabotaged the transmission lines.

ESCOM has reacted positively to the prospect of allowing Mozambique to provide electricity to Zimbabwe and has made known its "enthusiastic support" for this possibility. On the same occasion it offered all of the technical support necessary for this purpose. Dries Loots, an ESCOM spokesman, added that, "ESCOM cannot make use of the electricity produced by the Cabora-Bassa dam because of guerrilla activity. In any case we are already producing too much electricity."

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Mozambique

*** Results of Donors Consultative Conference Seen**

34000378B London AFRICAN BUSINESS in English
Jan 90 pp 28-30—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Article by Ivan Farai in Maputo: "Donors Pledge Help for the Struggle Ahead"]

[Text] Western donors and financing agencies have promised to give Mozambique the \$1.4bn it estimates that it needs in 1990 for its economic recovery programme.

The 22 countries and 11 multilateral bodies made the pledges at a World Bank sponsored meeting of the Consultative Group for Mozambique, held in Paris in November.

Paralysed by War

The aid is to finance the three-year (1987-90) programme, which aims to reverse the decline in GDP [gross domestic product] caused by a 14-year war between government forces and South African-backed guerrillas of the rebel Mozambique National Resistance movement.

The rebels have killed more than 100,000 people and have displaced millions more; they have wrecked rail lines, burnt factories and disrupted agriculture in a brutal campaign.

To restore growth and to service the country's crippling debt burden of around \$6bn, Mozambique estimates that it needs at least \$1.4bn a year between 1990 and 1993 in soft loans and grants.

The money is needed to import essential raw materials, machinery and spare parts needed to rehabilitate industry, transport, communications and agriculture.

The country also requires imported food to meet shortfalls in local production. Also needed are various consumer goods.

But to win the aid needed for the programme, which is supported by the World Bank and the IMF, the former Portuguese colony has to swallow a bitter economic pill.

It has pared down the administrative controls on the economy, has cut food subsidies, has lifted price controls, has trimmed public spending and has devalued its currency.

Overvalued Currency

The metical, which was pegged at MM200=\$1 in 1987, was set at MM742=\$1 in July 1989. The black-market rate, though, is MM2,400=\$1.

"The programme involves great sacrifices that are not likely to end in the near future," the government warns

in a 1989 economic report reviewing the programme, known by its Portuguese acronym PRE.

But the sacrifices have begun to pay off. After falling by an average 8 percent a year between 1981 and 1986, GDP expanded by 3.6 percent in real terms in 1987 and by 4.6 percent the following year.

Although these figures fall below a modest government target of 5 percent annually up to 1990, they are spectacular for a country whose dependence on foreign aid is so extreme that \$6 out of every \$7 worth of imported goods results from donations or credits.

The recovery has brought hope to a nation whose economy does not even generate enough resources for simple maintenance of existing stock.

Goods Are Back in the Shops

Goods are back in the shops—but at a price—and industries have started producing.

But the social costs have been phenomenal.

"While these measures brought some advantages...they had major repercussions on prices for consumers, with particularly serious effects in the urban areas," the government report admits.

"The cost of living increased dramatically and in some cases has become so high as to put at risk the health and nutritional status of the most vulnerable sectors of the population," it added.

For instance, the government points out that it is moving gradually towards balancing its budget; it has cut the budget deficit, as a proportion of total expenditure, from 29 percent in 1987 to a forecast 17.5 percent in 1989.

But the social sectors have suffered most from the cuts. Out of planned expenditure in 1989 of MM200bn, the sum of MM80bn, or 40 percent, is set aside for defence.

On the other hand, education and health received only MM19.7bn and MM10.9bn respectively (or 9.9 percent and 5.5 percent)—for a country with an officially estimated illiteracy rate of 80 percent and one of the highest infant-mortality rates of any developing country in the world.

The government is now counting on Mozambicans to tighten their belts even more, and on tentative moves towards peace with the rebels to build on the successes of recent years.

Farm output is expected to have grown by 9 percent in 1989, up from 2.6 percent in 1988, when production of crops such as maize, rice and cashew-nuts rose on the previous year.

Manufacturing production was projected to expand by 12 percent in 1989, from 5.1 percent the year before, as

the supply of raw materials improved and the state continued a programme to open the economy up to free enterprise.

Growth in transport and communications, a major earner of foreign revenue from freight charges, is expected to have expanded marginally, to 5 percent in 1989 from 4 percent in 1988.

But the balance of payments remained strained, according to the government report.

Exports of farm products and manufactures are expected to have earned the country \$121m in 1989, 21 percent increase over the previous year's figure.

Imports, excluding goods imported under an emergency relief programme, are estimated to have grown by 10 percent over the 1988 figure, to \$850m. The trade deficit for 1989, then, amounted to \$792m; export covered just 14 percent of imports.

The government plans to increase its hard-currency earnings, to negotiate cuts in debt repayments and to arrange new donations and soft loans to meet the yawning gap.

"Should the government fail in these efforts, this will force a reduction in imports, which will prejudice the economic recovery now under way," the report warns.

It concedes that the balance of payments for the 1989-91 period will remain heavily in deficit; the deficit is expected to rise to \$1.1bn in 1991, from \$1bn in 1989.

"There will be a continuing negative trade balance, since imports will remain much higher than exports," the report admits.

Mozambique expects debt relief and other forms of external funding to cover most of the deficit.

But to maintain the targeted growth rate of 5 percent annually to 1991, additional inputs worth an average \$89.6m are required every year, it adds.

"With support from Mozambique's creditors, this gap could be made good through loans and credit," the report points out.

The report contends that the issue of debt payments is fundamental to Mozambique's economic recovery programme. "Servicing the debt threatens to consume twice the value of Mozambique's exports in 1989, and the debt-service ratio could rise to an awesome 160 percent in 1991," it warns. But with favourable terms from creditors, debt-service payments in 1991 could amount instead to just 60 percent of the total value of exports, it stresses.

The report acknowledges that more hardships are in the offing. "The prospects ahead are for more years of difficult and hard work for a people that has already suffered more than its quotient of misery and hunger," the report concludes.

* Progress of Beira Port Rehabilitation Viewed

34000378A London NEW AFRICAN in English
Jan 90 pp 43-44—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Article by Guy Arnold: "Beira on the Brink"; first paragraph is introductory paragraph]

[Text] Beira port, Zimbabwe's best and most direct trade route, is gradually handling more traffic. Confidence is being restored and Renamo [Mozambique National Resistance] attacks on the railway and pipeline through Mozambique are becoming less frequent. Now it is a question of making Beira compete effectively with alternative means of transport. Guy Arnold reports after a recent visit.

Approximately 20 percent of Zimbabwe's exports and imports now use the port of Beira (although it will soon be able to handle a far greater proportion); the 300km Corridor which links Mutare in Zimbabwe with Beira has thus become a crucial lifeline for Zimbabwe itself but also for Mozambique for the contribution of the port to the Mozambique economy depends upon the working of the Corridor. The rehabilitation of port and corridor is the result of the SADCC [South African Development Coordination Conference] struggle to find donor funds and move the regional transport system away from its forced dependence upon routes through South Africa.

In 1988 Beira handled 2.2m tonnes of goods (imports and exports) altogether; the greater part was for Zimbabwe and included 670,000 tons of fuel that passed through the pipeline and represented 97 percent of Zimbabwe's total fuel needs. Only about 100,000 tons went by road, the great bulk of dry goods handled by the railway. Zimbabwe is most concerned about these developments.

Mugabe's government urgently requires alternatives to its dependence upon transport through South Africa and Beira was always its shortest and cheapest route to the sea. Now 3,500 Zimbabwe troops help Frelimo [Mozambique Liberation Front] guard the Corridor from the dwindling attacks by Renamo forces.

The Beira Corridor Group (BCG) in Harare, headed by Senator Denis Norman (the former Minister of Agriculture), is an independent body whose principal task is to persuade Zimbabwe business to invest in Beira and so ensure that the whole operation makes maximum business sense.

Starting with SADCC meetings in 1982 it took four years before agreement had been reached with a group of donors to finance the rehabilitation of port and corridor at an eventual estimated cost of about \$600m. Now virtually all the finances have been guaranteed (equivalent to ECU400m) and the main work of rehabilitation is well under way. After 1991 there will still be minor shortfalls of finances, principally to cover ongoing technical and administrative assistance. At present about 50 expatriate core staff are responsible for both the port and the railway operations.

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Aid covers three basic needs: investment in civil engineering and equipment; technical assistance including management for the port and railway; and long term development of organisation and manpower so that eventually Mozambicans can take over full executive control. At present there are about 30 key technical assistance personnel: 22 in the port itself to operate, maintain and carry out training; and eight in the Beira Corridor Authority which is run by the aid donors as a kind of Ministry of Transport to co-ordinate the work on the Corridor. Altogether aid is now being provided for the port, the railway, the road and for upgrading the city of Beira.

Work on both port and railway got under way in 1986. The railway needed to be relaid and this was done between January 1986 and July 1987 by National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ). The port required major works and the first phase of the rehabilitation should be completed in 1991.

Beira is now being developed as a container terminal and the EEC is financing the conversion of four wharves into a container facility at a cost of \$80m. Construction of the terminal (by the Italians) began in 1988 and should be completed by 1991 when the terminal will be one of the most up-to-date in the world. At the same time a new offshore oil terminal to handle large tankers is being constructed so as to release onshore space for other purposes such as the bulk handling of grain.

The channel which is 24km long is being deepened to 9m and widened so that Beira will be able to handle vessels up to 65,000dwt compared with the present limit of 28,000dwt. This work should be completed in 1990.

The rehabilitation is about half done; a second three year programme will commence in 1990 and that will see the completion of the structural alterations and modernisation. When all the work is finished the port functions will break down as follows: container terminal, oil terminal, coal handling facility, other bulk handling including roll-on-roll-off facilities for copper and a grain terminal.

If time schedules are maintained the total physical rehabilitation and buildings should be finished by mid-1991 when the port's handling capacity will have been increased to 7.2m tons a year. Then the port will be gradually turned over to indigenous control although at present those responsible believe it will be run by expatriates for a minimum of ten years and possibly for as many as 20.

The Corridor depends upon the port and vice versa. Travelling along the corridor is no longer a major hazard

and the reduction of Renamo attacks (the result of effective military patrolling) means that there is less sabotage. Even so, the railway remains the principal bottleneck because of a shortage of locomotives. Given that government writ does not run in many rural areas including those close to the Corridor the operation remain heavily dependent upon the continuing presence of substantial numbers of Zimbabwean troops.

Physical rehabilitation is relatively easy; it is a technical problem. Thereafter the problems will be political, managerial and social and likely to prove far more complex. Beira faces a major problem of management (as does Mozambique as a whole) because of the lack of training at almost all levels—two generations of children have missed school since 1975—and there will be no quick substitutes. Thus, donors who are prepared to provide training on their projects are most welcome. It is going to take many years before Mozambique can produce its own top level management for such tasks as running the port.

A quite different problem concerns pressures from the Chissano government to re-route Zimbabwe exports and imports through Maputo: this may be what the Mozambique government wants but Beira makes more practical sense as far as Zimbabwe is concerned.

Investors Encouraged

The economic about-face accomplished by Frelimo over the last few years and confirmed by the 5th Frelimo Congress this last August now means that Mozambique is ready to encourage private enterprise; this has been a key factor influencing the western donors. Now, for example, the West Germans are showing a growing interest in Beira as are the international shipping lines. The World Bank has made a commitment to assist in revamping the town of Beira, an operation that will require a further influx of aid personnel. All such measures have to be seen against a background dominated by the effects of war: endless bottlenecks and a local population, swollen by refugees from the war-torn rural areas, that is now in the region of 250,000. The social services (health and education) can only be revitalised with the economy looks up again.

At present almost everything is foreign financed while an assurance that the programme will remain in place (and this must depend upon the willingness of Zimbabwe to keep its troops guarding the corridor more or less indefinitely) is essential to maintain confidence. When the rehabilitation exercise has been completed the port will be expected to compete economically with other transport routes.

The Gambia

* President Jawara Reviews 25-Year Tenure

34000442 London WEST AFRICA in English
19-25 Feb 90 pp 264-265, 267, 268—FOR OFFICIAL
USE ONLY

[Interview with President Alhaji Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara by Ad'Obe Obe; date, place not given]

[Text] *How many of the major changes over the last 25 years were you able to anticipate?*

At the time we had aspirations to become independent. We also hoped independence would mean progress for the people and the nation. We are pleased that some progress has been made towards our goal.

Of course, not all of our aspirations have been realised. That's impossible in human affairs. Independence itself was our major achievement. After independence we managed to maintain a sense of unity and nationhood.

Is this sense of unity manifested by the transformation of your party from Protectorate Peoples Party to Progressive Peoples Party which both use the initials PPP?

The history of this country at the time was such that the political alignments were stronger in the Colony of Bathurst than in the provinces. All the political advancements in the earlier years actually took place in the Colony.

The Protectorate was more or less sidetracked in many ways. At the time that we came on the scene, a few years before 1959, there were societies in Banjul. There were people from the provinces who were in Banjul for some reason or the other, some were civil servants, some businessmen, some simply here to seek their fortune. They formed the Protectorate Peoples Society [PPS]. I joined the PPS after qualifying as a veterinary surgeon and working for the government. In 1959, the PPS turned political, becoming the Protectorate Peoples Party.

The British colonial authority naturally took a keen interest in what was happening. They could have influenced events by assisting some individuals and groups as opposed to the others. I would have thought they had some sympathy for the people for the Protectorate for lagging so far behind in political awareness. Anyway, I was approached to lead the PPP. This meant resigning my job. I gave it serious consideration. And I resigned.

In 1960 there were the first elections based on universal suffrage for both the Colony and the protectorate. But, even before we went into the election, I suggested that the name Protectorate Peoples Party was not terribly suitable, because our idea was a united Gambia without ethnic or regional discrimination. Our plan to campaign nationwide, including the Colony, would be contradicted by this name. So we changed the name to Progressive Peoples Party.

How did it actually feel in 1965 to have the combined responsibility of being the leader of the victorious party as well as the person leading his nation into independence?

In Bathurst then one thing led to another. One was not really in a position to see far into the future. One simply plunged into things, feeling we had to do something about our country, from political movements we have to advance our ideas to see what we could do to gain independence, to put our country on the path to development in various ways.

By the time we achieved independence in 1965, in spite of all the obstacles, one had a sense of fulfilment and satisfaction that our activities and campaign were actually leading somewhere.

It was exhilarating. Right from the time I was approached to resign my job. One had this commitment, more or less a blind commitment. My job was almost exceptional for a local person, because it was the job of a head of department, I was one of the first to head a department in this country.

Many people were amazed, indeed I was advised by many people that it would be foolish to resign, nobody knows where this could lead. It was pointed out that I would be dealing with people who in no time could betray you and knock you down, and how could I survive without a job and a family to feed.

This prophecy proved right. The very next year, 1960, most of the prominent people who actually pushed me into resigning my job to assume the leadership of the PPP let me down. And they almost succeeded in destroying me.

What happened?

It happened this way. I was the minister of education when the then Governor nominated me to represent the country at Nigeria's independence celebrations. Before my departure, I met with party leadership and we decided to write a manifesto calling for independence of The Gambia. This was in almost secrecy because we were aware that the idea of independence was complete anathema to the colonial authorities. I took the manuscript in my pocket and had it printed in Lagos. I came home with stacks of this four-page document which we called the Independence Manifesto.

No sooner had we started circulating than it came into the hands of the Governor. The Governor was furious. He called me into his office and remonstrated with me: What's this document here? What do you think you are doing? etc. From then on the colonial authorities turned against me with the Governor openly supporting the other parties. And the PPP became the bad guys. Before then I had been thinking we were the good guys. Our people were then molested and arrested for the most trivial things by the Commissioner and other officials.

But even more serious was the fact that I returned from Nigeria to discover that some prominent colleagues

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inside the PPP had been planning to ditch me and dissolve the party. And I would have been left without a job and a political office. It was a tough time. But we fought it. I was called to a meeting and told how we were to dissolve the PPP and form a new party under a new leadership. I said, not on your life. It would have to be over our dead bodies! I told them this party may be less than a year old but we are making much more progress than the parties which have been around for decades. The old politicians are welcome to dissolve their parties but the PPP remains. We had to call an extraordinary congress of the party to expel the member who was leading the campaign to kill our party. The congress took place in his very home town. It took a whole day, but at the end of the day we expelled him.

The political history of The Gambia since independence has almost become synonymous with the history of the PPP. What do you say to critics who argue that for one party to survive this long with a persistent overwhelming majority is not healthy for democracy?

As far as we are concerned the point is we opted for a multi-party democracy which we have practised to the letter. Opposition parties have operated freely, elections have all been free and fair. But we have stung the opposition. Right from the beginning there were other parties. They were strong, but unfortunately for them they over-concentrated their efforts in the Colony areas, so that their power base was very narrow.

By contrast the PPP was a nationwide party. We had support from all parts of the country. The size of the support has always been such that, given the conditions of free and fair elections, overwhelming majority is not a fault of the PPP. If we had achieved our success by contravening the rules of the game in any way then one could say it was unhealthy for the country.

In the last elections a government minister was unseated. The PPP fought hard but the minister could not be saved. We still ended up with a large majority. We cannot curtail the support that the people want to give us of their own free will.

With the tremendous political confidence built up since 1960, the 1981 attempted coup must have been very traumatic for you.

It was indeed a very traumatic experience for all of us. Typical of such events, it came as a surprise—these sort of things depend on the elements of surprise for their success. It was really a very traumatic experience, especially, as all along we had been practising multi-party democracy with free and fair elections. In fact, the leader of the coup, Kukoi Samba Sanyang was a candidate of one of the opposition parties, the NCP [National Convention Party], in the 1977 elections and he lost very badly. Of course we didn't realise at the time or soon afterwards that he was being cultivated and trained by an outside power, Libya, and prepared for staging this coup. It was a nasty surprise.

At independence we decided against having an army, instead, we chose to have a field force. It was a shock that this force was involved in the coup attempt. We have since then decided to have an army, trained as such. We also have a para-military force, known as *gendarmerie*, as well as the police. One thing which was lacking with the field force was that it was neither here nor there. It was not terribly well disciplined. Now we have a properly trained army and a *gendarmerie* which is an elite force. Our aim is to keep these armed forces well trained and well motivated.

What were the lessons of 1981?

The first lesson, of course, is never to drop one's vigilance. And to be really prepared as far as national security was concerned, to make sure that one has efficient force and effective intelligence for security and defence. We are too small to maintain forces for aggression against any country. But we have to make sure we have sufficient strength to defend our nation, at least for a period. In this day and age, national defence is a very complex matter, and it is sufficient for any nation to hold its own until the complexity of international relations is sorted out.

Observers have linked the coup attempt to the harsh economic realities which were said to have bred disaffection among the Gambian people.

By 1980, The Gambia was not suffering any more than any of our neighbours. We did suffer the drought, the price and production of groundnuts did fall, and I remember we had to devalue the dalasi from two to the pound to four. But on the whole we were not doing badly. Some countries were suffering even more than us.

I see the coup attempt as no more than a hostile country using its enormous resources to influence dissidents in countries targeted for destabilisation. Gambia was part of Libya's initial plan; if they had succeeded we could have seen destabilisation.

Did you have any fears about your economic survival, 25 years ago?

Twenty-five years ago we resolved that the main thrust of our economy would be agriculture. We were a monoculture, and we desired to diversify or establish some light industry and develop fisheries. We made progress in many of these areas, so much so that we were able to build up substantial reserves.

Then from the late sixties to the seventies, came the Sahelian drought which upset our agricultural programme. I remembered how in the sixties we got an upland rice variety from the Chinese and we grew acres and acres of it. The crop was really beautiful. I remembered seeing this at the height of the growing season and thinking our dream of self-sufficiency in rice was well on the way to being realised.

Our plans for continued agricultural expansion were badly set back. By the middle eighties the economy was in a very bad shape. This was due to a culmination of all

the difficulties: the drought, the fall in the price of commodities and deteriorating terms of trade, high interest rates in developing countries, currency instability on the international scene, etc. Our economy was indeed in a sorry state. We had to embark on ERP (Economic Recovery Programme) worked out with the IMF and the World Bank. I am happy to say that within a year of this programme we began to see positive results. We floated the dalasi, which up to then had been tied to the pound at five to one. By 1985 the black market in currency had diverted so much business from the banking system. When we floated it, the dalasi depreciated by something like 120 percent. But since then it has held very well. Among other unpleasant things we had to go under ERP were: retrenching civil servants, reorganising our parastatals, privatising some and renegotiating performance contracts with the others.

Another big problem that we face is the commodity terms of trade with the industrialised world. There has also been a considerable decline in the amount of official development assistance. But having embarked on ERP, our hope is to maintain the discipline which this has infused in our economic activities. I think this will stand us in good stead.

The idea of Senegambian federation has been around since pre-independence days. How did it develop into an essential feature of the history of post-independence Gambia?

When we were approaching independence the matter was looked at from various angles. The colonial powers were interested in what sort of relationship we could have. Senegal too was interested. In 1964 we made a joint approach to the United Nations to send a mission to advise on the possible sort of relationship post-independent Gambia could develop with Senegal. There were three options: complete integration, federation, or agreement between the two states after our independence. We were advised on the third option.

After independence we signed a treaty of association under which we set up a permanent Senegalese Secretariat to be located in Banjul and headed by Senegal. The Gambia was willing to apply for membership of UMOA (West Africa Monetary Union) and once admitted we would have abandoned the dalasi and adopted the CFA. The Senegalese did not like this. They said it had to be the confederation that should apply for membership. We said that Senegal was already a member; why could The Gambia, like other individual countries such as Mali, not apply on its own? The Senegalese did not like it. They did not even consider it. The Senegalese delegation refused to discuss it on the ground that they did not have the mandate to discuss it. So that was stalemate.

The issue of economic integration also took a long time and had not been resolved before the Confederation was dissolved. Senegal opted for a Customs union. We said that if we did that, it would cause grave harm to The Gambia's economy and it would disrupt the economic life of our country. We in turn proposed that the best

thing would be to start with a free trade area and progress gradually to a Customs union.

In 1981, following the involvement of the Senegalese in quelling the attempted coup, talks were resumed again and we decided to go into this Confederation arrangement by which Senegal would hold the office of President of the Confederation and Gambia the vice-presidency. There were two areas to be negotiated and agreed: economic union and monetary union. In the case of monetary union, the idea was to have a common currency. The Gambia was to abandon the dalasi and adopt the CFA. But how to go about this change became a problem.

Isn't it tragic that the Confederation should be beset with problems when people feel traditional ties point to a common destiny for the two nations?

We have to keep making efforts. Even after the sudden Senegalese withdrawal and the confederation was wound up, I wrote to President Diouf, suggesting that we meet to discuss how we could come back to our relationship. We are both independent nations; we need to cooperate for our mutual benefits. There is a strong bond between the Senegalese and Gambian peoples. There was greater enthusiasm for unity. Independence was fresh in the minds of the people, and there was some amount of good euphoria. Since then we have become more mellow through experience. We now know the practical difficulties as well as the possibilities. There is still the hope and wish for African unity, and a major plank here is regional cooperation through bodies like Ecowas [Economic Community of West African States], which now seems to have picked up after a period of near stagnation.

One disappointing area is the failure to implement fully the protocols on the free movements of citizens in the region because of national policies and relations between individual member states.

Trade between member states is still minimal compared with trade between Ecowas and the outside world. We must make efforts to rectify this.

How has your foreign policy developed over the years since independence?

Our foreign policy is designed to foster good relations with our immediate neighbours, subscribing to African unity and cooperation support to the United Nations and other international organisations whose aims are to foster international peace and development. Promotion of human rights features prominently in our policies, both domestic and foreign.

Your relationship with Britain has remained very close despite your eagerness to become a republic.

In 1965 we conducted a referendum to decide whether to become a republic. We failed to obtain the two-thirds majority of votes, so we tried again in 1970. We felt that going republic would really complete the process of nation building symbolically and practically. I could say

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I understand the reason of those who opposed the idea. Maybe they felt it might be a good idea.

What would you say are the main lessons of the last 25 years?

We could have prevented the coup attempt of 1981, had we been more vigilant. We were a little bit too relaxed. On the party side, perhaps others could remind me of things which might have been better done differently.

What do you count as your major success?

Adherence to multi-party democracy. Most countries in Africa start their post-independence politics with a multi-party system, but soon after a good many of the parties with large majorities decided to go over to one-party states. Within the PPP there was a strong movement to follow suit. I think one of my achievements was that as an individual I stood against it.

Also, all along I have emphasised respect for human rights. I think this has stood us in good stead, a small country but we were able to exert some influence both nationally and internationally in the area of human rights.

What, in your experience are the relative advantages and disadvantages of the small size of a country like The Gambia?

Smallness is best identified with power. So we lack power, we cannot have a powerful influence, like Nigeria. But there are advantages. The fact that, as small as we are, we are able to unite the variety of ethnic groups. From the very beginning we emphasised the importance of inculcating a sense of unity among our people. No doubt, because we are small, with six ethnic groups to contend with, we have been rather successful.

*** Paper Profiles National Army Commander**

34000443 London WEST AFRICA in English
19-25 Feb 90 p 278—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Article by Kaye Whiteman: "Top Brass in Banjul"]

[Text] Last August, when Senegal started pulling its troops out of The Gambia as a prelude to the winding up of the Senegambian Confederation, the limelight was suddenly thrust on the effective and unobtrusive colonel who was in charge of the still infant Gambian army. People had become so used to the idea of the 'confederal forces' dominated by the presence of several hundred crack Senegalese troops that the idea of a force that was simply Gambian, built on the ashes of the disbanded Field Force, was something of a novelty. Colonel Momodou N'Dow N'Jie, Commander of the Gambian National Army since its formation in 1984, is very much part of the new image of the Gambian military, which had been seriously tarnished after the debacle of the attempted *putsch* of 1981.

He was born in February 1949, at the Military Barracks in Bakau, where his father was a corporal in the then

Gambia Regiment of the West African Frontier Force. His father was actually a Senegalese from Thies who had been in Bathurst on business in 1944 and been drafted into the army as part of the war effort. He married a girl from Kaur, up-river, and Momodou was one of seven boys in a family of nine.

Raised in such a military environment, there was never any doubt where his career lay. After schooling at Primary School in Bakau, he was at the Gambia High School from 1961-7, and joined the Field Force straight away after leaving school. It will be recalled that the newly independent Gambia of 1965 prudently decided not to have its own army, but simply depend on the paramilitary Field Force of the Gambia Police, which well before independence had replaced the Gambia Regiment, even using its facilities, mess room, etc.

He rose rapidly through the ranks, coming for the first time to the UK as a sergeant, for the All Arms Drill Course at Pirbright in Surrey. He was commissioned in 1976, and returned to Britain in 1977 to do the graduate course at Sandhurst, as an Assistant Commissioner of Police. With regular promotions, by the time of the revolt in the Field Force of 1981 he had the rank of Deputy Commander. In fact, from 1976 to 1981, with the exception of several months at Sandhurst, he was ADC to President Jawara. Indeed, at the time of the July 29 *putsch* he was in London, accompanying the President to the royal wedding. At that time, he explains, the ADC job was not the full-time one, with security implications, that it is now. He was able to combine it, as a part-time function, with other duties.

On August 1, as the *putsch* was being put down by Senegalese troops, President Jawara appointed him Field Force Commander. He was charged with the task of raising elements of the force, using remaining loyalists, and new recruits.

Thus at the age of 31, he was charged with much more serious and complex tasks than he could have imagined, given the wreckage of the old Field Force, and the difficulties caused by the presence of Senegalese troops. In 1982, after the formal creation of the Senegambia the force was converted into a *gendarmerie*, on the Senegalese pattern, of which N'Dow N'Jie was in charge for the next two years, before actually handing it over to a Senegalese colleague with a training team, at which time he went off for further training before assuming his functions as Commander of the new National Army, to be formed entirely of new recruits. Given the rank of Lt Colonel, he was attached to the 19th Infantry in Colchester. In 1987 he went on further courses, to the Senior Staff College in Camberley, and to Paris to the Institut des Hautes Etudes de Defense Nationale (IHEDN). In February 1989, the first battalion was ready to receive its colours from the president. It is still a modest affair; the barracks is the old premises of the Teacher Training College at Yundum, abandoned when it was moved to Brikama, because the *gendarmerie* was occupying the old Field Force premises. There has been

assistance from the UK, France and the USA, mostly in terms of training equipment, uniforms, vehicles, etc. Senegalese assistance was confined to the *gendarmerie*, and Nigerian aid to the police. Pakistan also offered places for overseas courses.

The sudden break-up of the confederation, and the abrupt withdrawal of 'confederal' troops left a number of problems of equipment and logistics, as the Senegalese had been occupying some crucial functions, including presidential security. However, the Gambian army seems to have been up to the challenge in spite of some doubts expressed at the time, and are certainly due to be highly visible during the 25th anniversary celebrations.

Sierra Leone

* President Views Future, Identifies Priorities

34000431 London WEST AFRICA in English
5-11 Feb 90 pp 164-165—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Interview with President Joseph Momoh by Ad'Obe Obe: "Lessons and Hope"; first paragraph is WEST AFRICA introduction]

[Text] In an exclusive interview with WEST AFRICA the President of Sierra Leone, who recently celebrated four years in power, looks forward to his country's prospects in the coming decade and identifies his priorities.

[Ad'Obe Obe] What are the chances of Sierra Leone improving its fortunes in the coming decade?

[Momoh] The 1980s was undoubtedly a lost decade for Africa south of the Sahara. It's a decade we would rather forget. But in forgetting we shouldn't forget the lessons we have learnt. It is true that quite a lot of hardships endured were imposed on us: the unfair pricing for our commodities, huge debt burden, etc. Most of all, we must remember the mistakes that we made. One can generalise by saying it was mostly mismanagement on our part. I think we should be honest enough to be able to admit that. If I may take Sierra Leone as an example, we are endowed with a lot of resources. People at times wonder why there is so much poverty right in the midst of so much plenty. The answer is mismanagement. We have never been able to manage the resources to our own advantage. This is the lesson we have learnt. We have decided that now that we are entering a new decade, we must ensure that we eliminate all the mistakes of the past. At worst, we should minimise them, so that we realise some of the benefits for our resources.

[WEST AFRICA] Eastern Europe seems to be leading the world in "eliminating mistakes"; can we expect similar reforms in Sierra Leone?

[Momoh] To some extent, politics was responsible for the failure to make political gains. The point is when independence came, there was no much enthusiasm that we got carried away by the fact that we were now free.

For a long, long time we over-played politics to the extent we neglected our economies.

As for the example of Eastern Europe, the situation in most of the developing countries with a one-party system may just be exactly the same as those of Communist states. They were really totalitarian. There are similarities on the African continent, as in the case of Mozambique.

But in our own case, here in Sierra Leone, I can say that we have practised the one-party system in the most liberal form, to the extent there is little difference from the multi-party system.

We used to practise a multi-party system until we realised that it was too complex and rather sophisticated for our stage of development. We conducted a referendum and the people voted massively in favour of a one-party system. Nevertheless, if it should come to the point that, if the people say that once again the one-party system is unsuitable, and they want a multi-party system, then people like myself have an open mind on the issue. It is left to the people to decide.

[WEST AFRICA] Has your military background been of any advantage in your performance as President?

[Momoh] There is no doubt about that. What we desire most in this part of the world is the element of discipline. Personally, after a military career that spanned 27 years, I can safely say that I was able to imbibe discipline. I am finding it very useful in my present position. I can only hope that the rest of the country will be able to keep up with my pace when it comes to displays of discipline.

There is an attitude to work, a sense of responsibility, these are all qualities that we need now. On the whole, my military background has come in very handy in my present position.

[WEST AFRICA] Observers have noted how your recent speeches have been very tough, raising hopes of many Sierra Leoneans that very soon the gap between harsh economic realities and expectations of plenty would be bridged?

[Momoh] It is not an easy thing to bridge the gap. What we have decided to do is to lay the cards on the table, let the people of Sierra Leone know that we have tried the present methods for too long, and it is not good enough. We have to change. All those who are prepared to come with us are welcome. All those who are going to put obstacles in the way should be prepared to pay a heavy price. In other words, there is no time for passengers any more.

[WEST AFRICA] Those are tough words which could mean rough times ahead for some people...

[Momoh] Yes, I have always made the point that I don't believe in witch-hunting. I give everybody a chance to prove himself, good or otherwise. With all that liberty you should be prepared for the consequences without any exception whatsoever.

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[WEST AFRICA] Can some results be expected soon?

[Momoh] By the grace of God and by the will of the people.

[WEST AFRICA] The government's relationship with the local press is not quite cordial. What seems to be the problem?

[Momoh] We believe the media must be given every amount of freedom. If you muzzle the people for too long, it will get to a point where they'll not be able to absorb it any longer, they will explode and there will be developments similar to what is now taking place in Eastern Europe. However, the media too should realise this in going about their duties, they must be responsible, they cannot afford to be reckless. We feel very worried when we see people using the press irresponsibly and recklessly. My argument has always been that the journalist's pen is as lethal as the rifle in the hand of a military marksman. This means the pressman should be extremely cautious about what he commits to paper. That doesn't mean he should not criticise. My view is that anybody who is in a position of trust and doesn't want to be criticised is a fool. There are times we make mistakes inadvertently and we need to be called to order every so often. As long as the criticism is objective, there is nothing wrong with it. We sincerely hope the people who are in such a noble profession as the media should carry themselves with the decorum expected of them.

[WEST AFRICA] What is your view on African unity which in the last decade did not make its mark, despite numerous proclamations and resolutions?

[Momoh] Taking the Organisation of African Unity, for example, when you think of the diversity in culture, language, backgrounds and political affiliation, it is easy to see why it has been difficult for us to achieve the unity for which we have yearned over a long period. That goes for Ecowas [Economic Community of West African States] in which the 16 members are divided into Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone, Arabs etc. Nevertheless, it hasn't been a waste of time. We have been laying the foundation. In Ecowas we are getting to the point where we can talk positively of things like common currency, common airlines, etc. We are beginning to address the specifics. Let us only hope that we will be able to move forward more objectively than in the past. However, it may be remembered that not all of us are really independent, in the same sense. I have been in international conferences where some of us could not take decisions on their own, they would call for a break and phone somewhere and ask: "This is how far we have gone, what do you thing we should do?" There are hurdles in the way. But I'm sure eventually we'll get over them.

[WEST AFRICA] Do you not think the spirit of Ecowas is contradicted by such examples of fuel shortages in your country while Nigeria is a major oil producer?

[Momoh] Unfortunately I have not been able to enjoy the ease of having an oil producer in the region.

But we ought to be sincere enough to appreciate that Nigeria, too, has her own problems. In spite of the very good relationship between Babangida and myself, I feel scared to make certain requests to him. I know what he's going through, his problems are so much bigger than mine that it would be unreasonable to make some requests. In fact, with special reference to oil, I must admit that Nigeria is quite prepared to help any one of us who is prepared to fulfil specified conditions. If they attempt to be too kind they will really run into a lot of trouble.

[WEST AFRICA] You visited several countries last year. Have these visits had any influence on your foreign policy?

[Momoh] We are consistent in our foreign policy. We are totally opposed to apartheid, our belief in sanctions as a means of dismantling apartheid separates us from countries like Great Britain. The latest developments in South Africa are rather encouraging, not as much as we would have liked but the signs are positive.

One lesson which has come out quite clearly from my recent rivals is that North-South cooperation, which we have relied upon, is not effective to our benefit as we would like it to be. Therefore, we should increase the pace of South-South cooperation. When you are dealing with someone who at one time was in the same circumstance as yourself, he is likely to appreciate it. If you attempt to discuss poverty with a man who was born into a millionaire family he would not appreciate it fully, whereas someone who was once poor would be able to appreciate far more.

Naturally, we cannot do without the "Big Boys"; we still have to request assistance from them every so often. It would be much better to deal more with countries in the South. A lot of this came out so glaringly when I visited South-East Asia. When one considers that we all gained independence around the same time, and the strides they have been able to make now economically, we can pick up quite a lot from this experience.

[WEST AFRICA] Your handling of the black market in foreign exchanges seems to be approaching the method in Ghana and Nigeria.

[Momoh] Yes, we are working out now the mechanics of establishing foreign exchange bureaux all over the place. This is another way of agreeing with what I've always said: We are still learners when it comes to governing, so we try one method. If it doesn't work, we try something else. Incidentally, quite recently, I sent my minister of finance to Ghana to find out how actually they did one or two things. He came back and reported that he found his visit most rewarding.

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